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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
The arresting officer established the case and the Defendant, sensing
the inevitability of his plight, entered a plea of guilty. The City Court
Judge, a compassionate man, ... began his routine of delivering a
short lecture on the evils of alcohol ....
"Now you see, John, this...
is a perfect example of what happens when you start drinking. You go
out, you get drunk, you get behind the wheel, and here you are
severely injured. By the way, what's your prognosis?"
It was apparent ... that [the Defendant] considered the Judge's
question to be of utmost importance. However, it was also evident that
the Defendant had no idea what he was being asked. After a lengthy
silence, while the Defendant considered all the ramifications of his
possible responses, he looked the Judge square in the eye and said:
"Baptist?"'
Some believe that the "law" of local government, both decisional and
statutory, frequently hinges upon issues of denominational significance.
I.
A.

MUNICIPALITIES

Annexation

The survey period featured the first litigated appearance of a 1998
statute authorizing a county to impose a "bona fide land use classifica-

* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard
University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Deep appreciation is expressed to the Carl Vinson Institute of Government of the
University of Georgia for summer support, which contributed most significantly to the
preparation of this survey.
1. An account from R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw: LITE 11-12
(1997). For a general "profile" of local government law, those who practice it, and the
practice itself, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., A PROFILE: THE PEOPLE AND THE PRACTICE OF
GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1996); see also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local
Government Law: A Reflection on Thirty Surveys, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1994).
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tion objection" to a proposed municipal annexation.2 Baker v. City of
Marietta3 presented a trial court's decisions that the county had
insufficiently invoked the statute4 and that the statute itself was
unconstitutional. 5 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held the trial
judge's first decision to render his second decision ineffective.' The
court reasoned as follows:
When the trial court turned its attention to the petition for declaratory
judgment, it had already resolved the controversy between the county
and the city on the annexation and rezoning of the 16-acre parcel at
issue by ruling that the county commission chairman's objection,
endorsed by the county commission prior to the entry of final judgment,
was not sufficient to invoke the procedure which required resolution of
county-city disputes about annexation prior to the annexation being
effective.'
Accordingly, the court concluded, "there no longer existed an 'actual
controversy' between the city and county regarding the contested
annexation and re-zoning," and "the trial court could not enter a
declaratory judgment" of unconstitutionality.8

2. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-11 (2000). The statute defines "bona fide land use classification
objection" as "an objection to a proposed change in land use which results in a substantial
change in the intensity of the allowable use of the property or a change to a significantly
different allowable use." Id. § 36-36-11(a). The statute calls for resolution pursuant "to the
dispute resolution process required by" O.C.G.A. § 36-70-24. Id. § 36-36-11(b). For
perspective on the law of Georgia municipal annexation, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Law
of MunicipalAnnexation in Georgia: Evolution of a Concept?, 2 GA. L. REV. 35 (1967); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalAnnexation in Georgia: Nay-Sayers Beware (PlantationPipe
Line Co. v. City of Bremen), 5 GA. L. REV. 499 (1971); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal
Annexation in Georgia: The Contiguity Conundrum, 9 GA. L. REV. 167 (1974); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Municipal De-Annexation in Georgia: The Ins and the Outs, 27 GA. ST. B.J.
118 (1991) [hereinafter Municipal De-Annexation].
3. 271 Ga. 210, 518 S.E.2d 879 (1999). The municipality informed the county that it
would consider a petition for annexation of 16 acres of land and a petition for rezoning that
land from "residential" to "office-institutional." The chair of the county commission, by
letter, objected to the procedure, and the city proceeded to annex and rezone the property
without resolving the county's objections. Id. at 211, 518 S.E.2d at 881.
4. The trial court held that an objection by only the chair of the county commission was
insufficient and that no evidence of the ground of objection was presented to the court. Id.
at 212, 518 S.E.2d at 882.
5. Id. The trial court held the statute to violate GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4, by
giving a county the right to interfere with the municipality's internal decisions on zoning.
Id.
6. Id. at 215, 518 S.E.2d at 884.
7. Id. at 214, 518 S.E.2d at 883.
8. Id. "Entry of a declaratory judgment under such circumstances is an erroneous
advisory opinion which rules in a party's favor as to future litigation over the subject
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B. Dissolution
In 1993, the Georgia General Assembly provided an additional method
for dissolving municipal corporations via a procedure for identifying
"inactive municipalities" as those failing to provide at least three of
eleven enumerated services, failing to hold at least six council meetings
per year, and failing to hold regular elections s Automatically repealing
the charters of municipalities so identified on July 1, 1995, the statute
also empowered any citizen to bring thereafter an action for "a declaration of the dissolution of the municipal corporation. "1°
City of Lithia Springs v. Turley" presented a citizen effort under the
statute to dissolve a municipality allegedly failing to provide the
requisite services. 2 Although finding that the city provided "road and
street construction or maintenance"" services, the trial court declared
municipal-county contracts for other services unlawful 4 and issued an
order of dissolution. 5 On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals
disagreed: The court denied that the contracts clearly constituted illegal
"gratuities"" and also found triable issues of fact on other disputed

matter and must be vacated." Id. at 215, 518 S.E.2d at 884.
9. O.C.G.A. § 36-30-7.1(a) (2000). For a background discussion of all municipal
territorial boundary procedures, including the dissolution procedures prior to the 1993
statute, see Municipal De-Annexation, supra note 2. For notation of the statute's
enactment at the time, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 45 MERCER L.
REV. 325, 360 (1993).

10. O.C.G.A. § 36-30-7.1(j). "Any such action shall be brought in the superior court of
the county wherein the legal situs of the municipal corporation is located." Id.
11. 241 Ga. App. 472, 526 S.E.2d 364 (1999).
12. Id. at 472, 526 S.E.2d at 366. The municipality had been reincorporated in 1996
and had entered into a series of intergovernmental contracts for services with the county.
It was undisputed that the municipality held the requisite meetings and conducted the
requisite elections. As for the matter of citizen standing to challenge the city's existence,
the court observed that "[tihe plain language of the Code section gives the [citizens]
standing to bring this declaratory judgment action." Id. at 474, 526 S.E.2d at 367.
13. Id. at 473, 526 S.E.2d at 366.
14. For instance, the trial court found the fire protection contract to violate the
gratuities prohibition of the GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(a): "The General Assembly
shall not have the power to grant any donation or gratuity." Id. at 474, 526 S.E.2d at 367.
15. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to the citizens. Id. at 472, 526
S.E.2d at 366.
16. Id. at 475, 526 S.E.2d at 368. "Genuine issues of material fact exist about whether
[the county] is receiving substantial benefits under the Fire Protection Contract, and
further evidence is needed to establish whether it is receiving more than a nominal amount
of money." Id.
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services."7 Accordingly, the court vacated the order of dissolution and
reversed summary judgment against the municipality."8
C.

Officers and Employees
A focused issue of "duty" and the question of compensable "injury"
under workers' compensation constituted matters of concern to municipal
officers and employees during the survey period. Oglethorpe Development Group, Inc. v. Coleman 9 featured an effort to mandamus the
mayor's placement on the city commission's meeting agenda of a
developer's presentation of a feasibility study for operating the municipal
civic center.2 ° Rejecting that effort, the supreme court observed that
plaintiff had failed to counter the mayor's evidence that he "had no duty
or authority to set the agenda for the Commissioners' meetings."2 The
court emphasized that a "mandamus will not [be] issue[d] to compel an
22
officer to perform acts not within his official powers or duties."
In Columbus Fire Department/ColumbusConsolidatedGovernment v.
Ledford,23 the court of appeals affirmed an administrative law judge's
denial of a municipal firefighter's "post-traumatic stress" claim for
workers' compensation benefits.2 4 Emphasizing its "any evidence"

17. Id. at 472, 526 S.E.2d at 366.
The trial court found that the City provided road or -street construction or
maintenance services. We find that the City also provided water supply services.
There are material issues of fact with regard to whether the City provided fire
protection services, enforcement of its building code or planning and zoning
services.
Id. at 479, 526 S.E.2d at 370.
18. Id. at 472, 526 S.E.2d at 366. "Therefore, the [citizens] were not entitled to
summary judgment on the question of whether the City was inactive under OCGA § 36-307.1." Id.
19. 271 Ga. 173, 516 S.E.2d 531 (1999).
20. Id. at 173, 516 S.E.2d at 531-32. The city commission had previously authorized
plaintiff developer to obtain the feasibility study both for its operation of the civic center
and its construction of a hotel and conference center adjacent to the civic center.
Subsequently, the commission denied plaintiffs request to appear and present its study.
Id.
21. Id., 516 S.E.2d at 532.
22. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of the mayor's motions for
summary judgment. Id. at 174, 516 S.E.2d at 531. For treatment of the proliferating role
of mandamus in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING
MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1989) [hereinafter MISCASTING
MANDAMUS].

23. 240 Ga. App. 195, 523 S.E.2d 58 (1999).
24. Id. at 198, 523 S.E.2d at 61. The firefighter's claim form specified the "accident"
as "post-traumatic stress causing anxiety disorder." Id. at 195, 523 S.E.2d at 59. For
background on municipal workers' compensation law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Workers'
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standard of review, 25 the court agreed that the claimant had failed to
satisfy the condition that "his psychological problems arose out of an
accident in which a compensable physical injury was sustained."26 In
fact, the court observed: "[I]t is undisputed that on... the date of the
purported accident," a panic attack during a survival training session,
the claimant "did not sustain any physical injury."2 7 Accordingly, the
court reversed the trial judge's reversal of the administrative law judge's
decision.28

D. Elections
The municipal mayor's election attracted challenge in Holton v.
Hollingsworth,2s an attack upon the validity of a vote cast by a
convicted felon who had completed his sentence but failed to reregister
to vote. ° Although rejecting the attack, the supreme court conceded
that a convicted felon could not vote or remain registered to vote while
serving his sentence.31 Nevertheless, the court asserted, "a person who
loses his status as a registered voter does not have to sign his name
again before the registrars may lawfully restore his name to the list of

Compensation in Georgia Municipal Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 57 (1980).
25. "When supported by any evidence, findings of fact by the State Board are conclusive
and binding on reviewing courts, and judges lack authority to set aside an award based on
disagreement with the Board's conclusions." 240 Ga. App. at 196-97, 523 S.E.2d at 60-61.
26. Id. at 197, 523 S.E.2d at 61. The court elaborated that
in order for a psychological injury to be compensable, it must satisfy two
conditions precedent: (1) it must arise out of an accident in which a compensable
physical injury was sustained; and (2) while the physical injury need not be the
precipitating cause of the psychological condition or problems, at a minimum the
physical injury must contribute to the continuation of the psychological trauma.
Id.
27. Id. "[The claimant's physician] concluded that [claimant] had experienced a panic
attack." Id.
28. Id. at 196, 523 S.E.2d at 60. "The superior court erred by substituting its own
findings and in reversing the State Board's award." Id.
29. 270 Ga. 591, 514 S.E.2d 6 (1999).
30. Id. at 591-92, 514 S.E.2d at 8. The court explained that under the circumstances
three voters must be disqualified in order for plaintiffs challenge to succeed. Id. at 592,
514 S.E.2d at 8. In addition to the attack upon the felon's vote, plaintiff also challenged
an absentee ballot and alleged four other voters unqualified on grounds of residency. Id.
at 592-93, 514 S.E.2d at 8-9. The court rejected the additional challenges as well. Id. at
594, 514 S.E.2d at 10.
31. Id. at 592, 514 S.E.2d at 8. The court relied upon GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 3(a):
"No person who has been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude may register,
remain registered, or vote except upon completion of the sentence." Id.
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registered voters."3 2 Consequently, the convicted felon "did not have to
'reregister' once he completed his sentence," and his vote was valid.33
E.

Powers

Municipalities confronted charges of bad faith and impropriety in an
assortment of power contexts. City of Marietta v. Edwards34 presented
such a charge against the municipality's condemnation of property it had
sold to the condemnees only three months earlier.35 Plaintiffs claimed
that they were misled during the sales proceeding and that the city had
Reviewing the
exercised its condemnation power in bad faith.36
evidence, the supreme court viewed assurances by the city's sales
facilitator to show "at most, that the [c]ity's condemnation plans were
uncertain, changing, and inaccurately communicated during the course
of ... [the] sales transaction."37 That evidence, the court asserted,
"does not show bad faith in the subsequent condemnation," for it does
not reveal "'conscious wrongdoing motivated by improper interest or
will." 38

32. Id. The court reasoned that "the phrase 'remain registered' refers to the status or
condition of being registered or having one's name on the list of registered voters, rather
than signing the oath and otherwise complying with the registration law." Id.
33. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's decision upholding the validity of the
election. Id. at 594, 514 S.E.2d at 10.
34. 271 Ga. 349, 519 S.E.2d 217 (1999).
35. Id. at 349, 519 S.E.2d at 217. Plaintiffs alleged that they purchased the property
from the municipality in November, that they spent substantial amounts of money on
renovations, and that the council voted to condemn a right-of-way through the property in
February. Id.
36. Id. at 349-50, 519 S.E.2d at 217-18. One of plaintiffs testified that the city's sales
facilitator told him that if he refused to sell the property to the municipality, "'the matter
would, more than likely, be dropped.'" Id. at 350, 519 S.E.2d at 218 (quoting testimony
from trial).
37. Id. The court reasoned that the municipal agent's statement "indicates only that
the City probably would not exercise its legal right of condemnation. It certainly does not
guarantee that the City would not do so." Id. Moreover, the court elaborated that
plaintiffs were attempting "to estop the City from the exercise of its right of eminent
domain by asserting [the agent's] unauthorized statements as evidence of the City's bad
faith. This is precisely what [statutory law] prohibits." Id. For treatment of estoppel as
it applies in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1995).

38. 271 Ga. at 351, 519 S.E.2d at 218 (quoting Craven v. Georgia Power Co., 248 Ga.
79, 80, 281 S.E.2d 568, 569 (1981)). "The question is whether the City has lost the
constitutional right to condemn the property because of its subsequent bad faith exercise
[T]he Court of Appeals [283 Ga. App. 622, 504 S.E.2d 726] erred in
of that right ....
reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. . . ." Id., 519
S.E.2d at 219 (emphasis added).
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The court of appeals also turned a deaf ear to charges of condemnation
improprieties in City of Griffin v. McKemie."9 There, the municipality
filed a petition to condemn plaintiffs' land for a sewer line but later
(when the award exceeded the city's appraisal) abandoned the condemnation and redesigned its sewer system. 40 The court rejected plaintiffs'
claim for attorney fees under the Georgia Relocation Assistance and
Land Acquisition Act 4 ' because no federal funds financed the city's
sewer project. 4' As for plaintiffs' remaining statutory authority for
attorney fees, the court held "'there must be some evidence of improper
conduct.'" 41 Yet, the trial judge's order revealed "only that the City
made an economic decision to abandon the proceedings, a decision which
is not the equivalent of improper conduct.""
Providing a distinctive contrast in settings, Pyle v. City of Cedartown45 arose from the municipality's disposition of a cemetery lot. In
conveying to her stepson the title to her late husband's lot, plaintiff
charged that the city had acted fraudulently and with the intent of
inflicting emotional distress.46 Once again, the court could not find
sufficient municipal culpability.47 On the charge of fraud, the evidence
revealed neither misrepresentation nor deception by the municipal

39. 240 Ga. App. 180, 522 S.E.2d 288 (1999).
40. Id. at 180, 522 S.E.2d at 289. "Following the dismissal of the condemnation action,
the [plaintiffs] filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 22-4-7 and 9-15-14."
Id.
41. O.C.G.A. §§ 22-4-1 to -14 (1982 & Supp. 2000).
42. 240 Ga. App. at 181, 522 S.E.2d at 290. The court reasoned that "the Act contains
legislative findings declaring its applicability when a public entity 'acquires land, with
federal financial assistance, for a public use.'" Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 22-4-2 (1982)).
43. Id. at 182, 522 S.E.2d at 290 (quoting Department of Transp. v. Woods, 269 Ga. 53,
56, 494 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1998)). "To sustain an award of fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(b) in
a condemnation case, the Supreme Court has held that 'there must be some evidence of
improper conduct, a lack of substantial justification, or an intent to delay or harass.'" Id.
44. Id., 522 S.E.2d at 291. "The order, therefore, does not contain a specific finding of
improper conduct sufficient to support the award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-1514(b)." Id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's award of attorney fees to the
plaintiffs. Id.
45. 240 Ga. App. 445, 524 S.E.2d 7 (1999).
46. Id. at 446, 524 S.E.2d at 8. Plaintiff and her stepson were together when the burial
lot was selected. Plaintiff told the municipal cemetery superintendent that the plot should
be placed in her name, but later, upon instructions from the funeral home, the municipality
conveyed the plot to the stepson. Id. at 445-46, 524 S.E.2d at 8.
47. Id. at 446, 524 S.E.2d at 8.
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duty
agent.48 Similarly, the court held that a mere breach of municipal
49
did not rise to intentional infliction of emotional distress:
Even assuming the City breached its duty to [plaintiff] by transferring
title to her husband's burial plot to her stepson, "[u]nder these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment...
and leave him to exclaim '[o]utrageous!'" 5 °
F

Regulation

The Georgia Supreme Court passed upon the municipal exercise of
regulatory power in the contexts of historic districting, alcoholic beverage
2 the
sales, and the suppression of litter.5 ' In City of Dalton v. Carrol,"
court rejected a plea in laches against municipal enforcement of historic
district requirements.5 3 Because the city did not discover until five

48. Id. at 447, 524 S.E.2d at 9. The court enumerated five elements of "the tort of
fraud," and reasoned as follows: "Even if [the municipal agent] made a representation...
by asking for and writing [plaintiff's] name and address as the person to whom the City
was to convey the burial plot, there is no evidence that [the agent] intended the representation to be false." Id.
49. Id. The court enumerated four elements for "a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress" and reasoned as follows: "Although there may be evidence to show that
[plaintiff] suffered severe emotional distress, there is no evidence that the City intended
to harm her." Id.
50. Id. (quoting Williams v. Stepler, 227 Ga. App. 591,594,490 S.E.2d 167, 171 (1997)).
The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment to the municipality
on both claims. Id. at 448, 524 S.E.2d at 9.
Although an action for municipal breach of a construction contract, in Savannah Airport
Comm'n v. Higgerson-Buchanan,Inc., 238 Ga. App. 548, 519 S.E.2d 475 (1999), the court
of appeals found the necessary "bad faith." There, the court held the evidence clear that
under the contract, the contractor was to clear the area within the project plans, that the
city commission later purported to reduce the number of acres included in the project, and
that the commission's action was not a "change order," but rather "was done for the
purpose of giving the Commission an economic advantage to the detriment of the
contractor." Id. at 551, 519 S.E.2d at 477. Thus, the court affirmed a finding of liability
against the commission. Id.
51. For treatment of the municipal regulatory power in an assortment of litigated
contexts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., 'AscertainableStandards"versus 'Unbridled Discretion"
in Local Government Regulation, GA. COUNTY GOV'T MAG. 19 (Dec. 1989) [hereinafter
"AscertainableStandards"versus 'Unbridled Discretion"];R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion
in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974) [hereinafter Discretion];R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15
GA. L. REV. 1039 (1981) [hereinafter A Sobering Vignette]; R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning
by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115
(1974) [hereinafter Reasoning by Riddle].
52. 271 Ga. 1, 515 S.E.2d 144 (1999).
53. Id. at 2, 515 S.E.2d at 145.
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months later that the landowner's predecessor in title had erected a
metal carport in the historic district, "it was the failure of ... [the]
predecessor-in-title to seek the required building permit that caused the
delay between the illegal construction in December and the city's
discovery of it in May.,5 4 Consequently, the court reasoned, "the city
was not responsible for any prejudice that [the landowner] suffered due
to the five-month delay in enforcement."55
The court likewise sided with the local government in Dickerson v.
Augusta-Richmond County Commission,56 an action to mandamus the
issuance of a license to retail off-premises beer and wine.57 Although
the convenience store had operated under a license for thirty years prior
to plaintiff's purchase of the establishment, the court denied the request
for mandamus.5 " Observing the objections offered at the license
hearing59 and the government's stated reasons for its denial,6" the
court upheld the decision as "based on specific, objective criteria set forth
in the ... Code."6' 1 "'Each licensing request is unique,"' the court
reminded the plaintiff, "'and must be considered individually, based on
factors present at the time.'"62

54. Id. at 1-2, 515 S.E.2d at 145. "Among the factors to consider in determining
whether laches applies are the length of the delay, the reasons for it, the resulting loss of
evidence, and the prejudice suffered." Id.
55. Id. at 2, 515 S.E.2d at 145. Additionally, the court reasoned that the landowner
had made no effort to comply with the city ordinances, and although the historic
commission had twice placed the issue on its agenda, the landowner failed to attend either
meeting. Id. "Under these circumstances, we conclude that it is not inequitable to permit
the city to enforce its claim against [the landowner]." Id. The court thus reversed the trial
judge's application of laches in favor of the landowner. Id.
56. 271 Ga. 612, 523 S.E.2d 310 (1999).
57. Id. at 612, 523 S.E.2d at 310.
58. Id. at 613, 523 S.E.2d at 31. Marking the "drastic" nature of mandamus, the court
noted that "itwill not issue to compel a public official to do a discretionary act unless the
official has grossly abused such discretion." Id. For an in-depth discussion of mandamus
in Georgia local government law, both the extensive popularity of the proceeding and the
judicial restrictiveness in its utilization, see MISCASTING MANDAMUS, supra note 22.
59. These touched upon the store's location in proximity to churches and recreation
centers, an increase in traffic and minors near the store, and a rise in crime rate in the
locality. 271 Ga. at 612, 523 S.E.2d at 311.
60. The governing authority reasoned that "the character of the neighborhood would
be affected adversely if the application were granted." Id.
61. Id. at 613, 523 S.E.2d at 311. The court cited the Augusta-Richmond County Code
§ 6-2-64(f), which enumerated schools, churches, libraries or public recreational areas. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Chu v. Augusta-Richmond County, 269 Ga. 822, 825, 504 S.E.2d 693,
693 (1998)). The court thus affirmed the trial judge's denial of plaintiffs petition for
mandamus. Id.
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The municipal regulation of litter enjoyed far less success in States-

boro Publishing Co. v. City of Sylvania. 3

There, the ordinance

prohibited distribution of free written materials in yards, in driveways,
or on porches' and required that the materials be delivered personally,
by mail, or by a "mailbox hanging device."65 Characterizing this
ordinance as an invalid regulation of content-neutral speech under both
state and federal constitutions, 6 a majority of the court elaborated its
objections. 7 First, the court pointed to existing less intrusive means of
preventing such litter;68 second, the court deemed the permitted
alternative delivery methods to be "prohibitively expensive."69

G. Liability
Claimants' efforts at hurdling the barrier of municipal tort immunity
abated only slightly during the period under scrutiny.7" One source of
that immunity is the Recreational Property Act, 71 the statute exempting landowners from any "duty of care to keep the premises safe for
entry or use by others for recreational purposes."7 2 The court of

63. 271 Ga. 92, 516 S.E.2d 296 (1999).
64. Defendant "delivers the Penny-Saver, a weekly shopper newspaper, without charge
to ... city residents by throwing the paper in yards or driveways." Id. at 92, 516 S.E.2d
at 297.
65. Id.
66. The court held that the ordinance includes "within its scope every kind of
unsolicited written speech" and that it "bans a substantial amount of speech that residents
may want to hear and that the city has not shown creates litter or destroys its beauty."
Id. at 94, 516 S.E.2d at 298.
67. Id. at 95-96, 516 S.E.2d at 299.
68. Id. at 94, 516 S.E.2d at 289. The court mentioned such means as requiring the
publisher to retrieve uncollected papers in a timely manner, prosecuting the publisher for
papers found in streets, and punishing residents for failing to collect litter from their own
yards. Id.
69. Id. at 95, 516 S.E.2d at 299. "A city cannot limit the speaker or publisher to
methods of delivery that are prohibitively expensive, such as mail or hand delivery." Id.
The court thus reversed the trial judge's decision of constitutionality. Id. at 96, 516 S.E.2d
at 299.
70. For orientation, perspective, and general chronology on municipal liability
(immunity), see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN
GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988) [hereinafter MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY]; R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,

Georgia Local Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
19 (1985-86) [hereinafter The "Crisis"Conundrum];R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government
Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993) [hereinafter The
Summer of '92].
71. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (1982).
72. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-22 (1982). The statute declares its object "to encourage owners of
land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by
limiting the owners' liability toward persons entering thereon for recreational purposes."

2000]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

351

appeals employed that exemption in Julian v. City of Rome7 3 against
a bicycle rider injured in a fall upon a muddy city-owned walkway.74
On grounds that the municipality intended the walkway as an extension
of a county park,75 maintained by the county recreational authority,7"
the court rejected plaintiff's action in negligence."
Although the
walkway ended in the "downtown [area] and provide[d] access to the
city's businesses, any 'indirect financial benefit' the city may derive for
this access
does not remove the Riverway from the protection of the
08
RPA.

The municipality's nonownership of property may also prove dispositive of a negligence claim. Moore-Sapp Investors v. Richards7 featured
the action of one who, without permission, walked across property owned
by a third party and stepped into a hole where a city water meter "either
was or had been at one time."8 0 Expressing incredulity at the resulting
negligence action,81 the court asserted that if plaintiff "had no permission to cross the land on which the hole was located and was owed no
duty of exercising ordinary care by the owner of the land, it defies logic
to find that he was owed a greater duty by the city, which did not own
the land." 2
The court proved far more receptive to the negligence claim advanced
in Harper v. City of East Point 3 for a sexual assault committed by a

Id. § 51-3-20.
73. 237 Ga. App. 822, 517 S.E.2d 79 (1999).
74. Id. at 822, 517 S.E.2d at 80.
75. "No fee is charged for the use of the Riverway. Although the Riverway is owned by
the City.... it is primarily maintained by the county recreational authority." Id. at 823,
519 S.E.2d at 80.
76. "Thus, the RPA shields landowners from liability arising under a negligence cause
of action." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567,569, 511 S.E.2d 517,519
(1999)). The court thus affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for the municipality.
Id.
79. 240 Ga. App. 798, 522 S.E.2d 739 (1999).
80. Id. at 798, 522 S.E.2d at 741. Plaintiff was taking a short cut to a store at night.
The trial court had held that because the municipality did not own the property, it owed
plaintiff a duty of ordinary care. Id. at 799, 522 S.E.2d at 741.
81. The court also held the property owner entitled to summary judgment: "A
landowner is under no duty to keep premises in a safe condition for the benefit of
trespassers or bare licensees." Id.
82. Id. at 800, 522 S.E.2d at 742. "Because we have determined that the hole was not
a mantrap and no evidence was introduced that the city acted wantonly or wilfully, the
trial court erred in denying the city's motion for summary judgment." Id.
83. 237 Ga. App. 375, 515 S.E.2d 623 (1999).
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municipal police officer.84 Reversing the trial judge's adverse summary
judgment, 5 the court carefully reviewed plaintiff's evidence of negligent
retention. 8 The court assessed a series of previous complaints by
women against the officer as follows: 7 "A jury could find that [the
officer's] conduct gave warning to the City that his behavior reflected an
escalating sexual deviancy likely to result eventually in the sexual
assault of a female while he was on duty."8
On two occasions, claimants sought (unsuccessfully) to employ the
8 9
"nuisance" escape from municipal tort immunity.
City of Douglasville
v. Queen" presented an action on behalf of two small girls struck by a
train while attending the city's Fourth of July parade.9 ' On grounds
that "it was not unlawful for the City to route the parade in issue onto
those streets that passed next to railroad property," the supreme court
rejected "as a matter of law the position that the City's holding of its
parade in the vicinity of railroad property which contained no danger
created or maintained by the City constituted a nuisance."92

84. Id. at 375, 515 S.E.2d at 624. The officer had sexually assaulted plaintiff while she
was locked in the back of his patrol car. Id.
85. "The City persuaded the trial court that [plaintiff] presented no evidence it had
constructive knowledge of [the officer's] propensity to sexually assault another person." Id.
at 376, 515 S.E.2d at 625.
86. Id. "[Plaintiff] presented evidence from which a jury could find that the City should
have known that [the officer] was prone to committing a sexual assault." Id.
87. Those complaints had advanced from harassing phone calls, to intimate questions,
to following, to attempting to peer around a door at a woman in her nightgown. Id. at 377,
515 S.E.2d at 626.
88. Id.
Moreover, [the officer] was a police officer, a position that wields enormous power
and intimidation over those vulnerable citizens an officer is sworn to protect. The
City as his employer owed a higher duty to protect citizens from an abuse of that
power, a duty which private employers do not share.
Id.
89. For treatment of nuisance liability in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 117-34 (4th ed. 1988);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1
(1991) [hereinafter Nuisance or Not?]; R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalLiability in Georgia:
The "Nuisance"Nuisance, 12 GA. ST. B.J. 11 (1975).
90. 270 Ga. 770, 514 S.E.2d 195 (1999).
91. Id. at 770, 514 S.E.2d at 197. The parade route traditionally employed the city's
main business thoroughfare, which was adjacent to the railroad. The girls attended the
parade with their parents and were struck while walking on the railroad tracks. Id. at
772, 514 S.E.2d at 198.
92. Id. at 773, 514 S.E.2d at 199. The supreme court thus reversed the court of
appeals' denial of a summary judgment to the municipality on the nuisance claim. Id. The
court stated: "To hold otherwise would be to label as a nuisance any properly-conducted
activity held by a public entity on any of its property that is adjacent to and does not
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The court of appeals proved equally unreceptive to the nuisance charge
in City of Vidalia v. Brown,9 3 a pedestrian's action for injuries from
stepping into a hole "located about nine feet from the edge of the paved
street near the middle of the ten-foot wide strip used as a drainage area
which also contained public utility lines and a residential mailbox."94
Employing the supreme court's nuisance "guidelines" from City of
Bowman v.Gunnells," the court concluded that "there was no evidence
of a defect or degree of misfeasance in excess of mere negligence
sufficient to establish a nuisance."'
Two instances of the period turned upon the historic "ante litem
notice" requirement, the statutory mandate that, prior to filing suit
against a municipality, claimants must provide written notice of the
claim within six months of the incident. 97 In Evans v.City of Covington,98 plaintiff contacted the city about her fall on a defective sidewalk;

improperly encroach upon railroad tracks." Id. In this opinion, Justice Hines dissented.
Id. at 774, 514 S.E.2d at 199.
As for plaintiffs' claim in negligence, the supreme court held that the municipality had
breached no duty to the girls either in regard to actions affirmatively undertaken or in
regard to actions not undertaken. Id. at 772, 514 S.E.2d at 198. On the "nonfeasance"
doctrine of "public duty," see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia'sPublic Duty Doctrine: The
Supreme Court Held Hostage, 51 MERCER L. REV. 73 (1999) [hereinafter Georgia'sPublic
Duty Doctrine].
93. 237 Ga. App. 831, 516 S.E.2d 851 (1999).
94. Id. at 834, 516 S.E.2d at 854. Plaintiff stepped in the hole while walking from
house to house with her children on Halloween night for trick-or-treating. Id. at 831, 516
S.E.2d at 852. "The hole at issue, which was about three feet long and one and a half feet
wide, was in a grassy area about nine feet from the edge of the paved street, placing it
within the ... ten-foot wide strip constituting the outer portion of the City right-of-way."
Id. at 832, 516 S.E.2d at 852. As for municipal responsibility for a street or sidewalk
defect, the court asserted that '[the record plainly and indisputably shows that the hole
was not located on a City street or sidewalk." Id. at 834, 515 S.E.2d at 854. Municipal
responsibility for street or sidewalk defects is of ancient origin and is now codified at
O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 (1996). For treatment of the liability, see MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY,
supra note 70, at 62-116.
95. 243 Ga. 809, 256 S.E.2d 782 (1979). Those "guidelines" focus upon whether there
is more than mere negligence, whether the defect was continuous or regularly repetitious,
and whether the city failed to act within a reasonable time after knowledge. Id. at 811,
256 S.E.2d at 784.
96. 237 Ga. App. at 836, 516 S.E.2d at 855. "There was no evidence that the drainage
area was commonly used as a walkway, and there was no evidence that anyone else had
stepped into or been harmed by the hole prior to [plaintiffs] accident." Id.
97. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (2000). For analysis of the statute, its history, and its
application in the cases, see MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY, supra note 70, at 145-74; R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaMunicipal Tort Liability: Ante Litem Notice, 4 GA. L. REV. 134 (1969);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Ante Litem Notice: Causefor Pause,URBAN GA. MAG. 24 (Oct. 1978).
98. 240 Ga. App. 373, 523 S.E.2d 594 (1999).
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the municipality referred plaintiff to its insurer; and the insurer began
payments to plaintiff under a partial settlement preserving plaintiff's
right to seek further compensation if her injuries proved worse than
expected. When the insurer subsequently refused to make further
payments, more than six months after the accident, plaintiff sent the
municipality written notice of her claim. 99
Affirming summary
judgment for the municipality, the court of appeals held that neither the
city,'
its officials,0 1 nor its insurer 2 possessed power to waive
plaintiff's timely compliance with the notice mandate, and "a city cannot
be estopped from raising the defense of no ante litem notice."0 3
The second instance, Jacobs v. Littleton,0 4 arose out of plaintiff's
arrest by a municipal police officer. When plaintiff subsequently sued
the arresting officer, the municipality, the municipal police department,
and other municipal officials, the trial court rendered summary
judgment for all defendants on grounds that plaintiff failed to provide
ante litem notice.0 5 The court of appeals held the notice mandate
applicable only to claims against the municipality.'0 6 Accordingly, the
court upheld summary judgment to the city and its police department
but reversed as to "the individual city employee defendants."0 7
Finally, City of Griffin v. Jackson... presented an action resulting
from plaintiff's collision with a municipal police vehicle. On appeal, the
city complained that the trial judge had struck the city's pleadings as a

99. Id. at 374, 523 S.E.2d at 595. Ten months after her accident, plaintiff concluded
that her injuries were worse, but the insurer refused to pay more than $15,000. Plaintiff
then sued the city for negligence. Id.
100. "[A] city council has no right to waive the requirements of OCGA § 36-33-5.. .
Id. at 375, 523 S.E.2d at 596.
101. "Even if a city official had expressly waived the requirement, this waiver would
have been ineffectual." Id. at 374, 523 S.E.2d at 596.
102. "[Ain insurer is not an agent of a city for purposes of the ante litem notice." Id.
at 375, 523 S.E.2d at 595.
103. Id., 523 S.E.2d at 596. For treatment of estoppel's operation in the law of local
government generally, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA
LOcAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1985).
104. 241 Ga. App. 403, 525 S.E.2d 433 (1999).
105. Id. at 403, 525 S.E.2d at 435. The arrest followed an incident at a school board
meeting; an altercation ensued; and both the officer and the arrestee were injured. Id. at
403-04, 525 S.E.2d at 435.
106. Id. at 405, 525 S.E.2d at 436. The court reasoned that the notice statute must be
strictly construed as in derogation of the common law. Id. Accordingly, the statute
"requires notice only if the claim is against the municipality; it does not require ante litem
notice to individual employees of a municipality." Id.
107. Id. Additionally, the court denied plaintiff's contention that her mental incapacity
tolled the running of the notice statute with respect to the municipality. Id.
108. 239 Ga. App. 374, 520 S.E.2d 510 (1999).
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sanction for failing to produce relevant photographs."°9 After lengthy
review of the evidence, the court sustained the trial judge's actions:" 0
"[I]t is not necessary to show intentional destruction or hiding of the
photographs to support the imposition of sanctions.""' Rather, "the
evidence was sufficient to show a consistent pattern of conduct by the
city calculated to frustrate any attempt to locate the photographs and to
mislead the court and the plaintiff as to the fate of the photographs." 2
H.

Authorities

Haney v. Development Authority of Bremen" 3 presented the supreme
court with a novel issue: the original interpretation of a statute enacted
thirty years previously-The Public Lawsuits Act."' The case featured
an intervention by city residents to oppose the municipal development
authority's issuance of revenue bonds to finance construction of a public
golf course in the city's industrial park. "' Plaintiffs appealed from the

109. Id. at 374, 520 S.E.2d at 511. After first denying and then admitting that it
possessed photographs of the accident scene, the municipality failed to comply with the
trial court's order to produce them. Id. at 375, 520 S.E.2d at 512. "Despite the trial court's
order, the city still did not produce the photographs. On May 16, 1997, 18 months after
first stating that it would produce the ... photographs, the city filed a motion for
protective order, claiming that it was unable to locate the photographs." Id.
110. Id. at 377, 520 S.E.2d at 513. The court emphasized the broad discretion
possessed by judges in applying sanctions against disobedient parties. Id.
111. Id. at 378, 520 S.E.2d at 513. This was the court's response to the city's argument
that there could be no finding of willfulness because there was no direct evidence that the
city maliciously destroyed the photographs in order to avoid producing them to plaintiff.
Id. at 377, 520 S.E.2d at 513.
112. Id. at 378, 520 S.E.2d at 513.
It is at least arguable that the mere disappearance of photographs within the
control of a party, which have been the subject of litigation for more than a year
and which the party has repeatedly promised and been ordered to produce, can
support an inference of bad faith, particularly where the party offers no
explanation as to how they disappeared.
Id. at 378-79, 520 S.E.2d at 514.
113. 271 Ga. 403, 519 S.E.2d 665 (1999).
114. O.C.G.A. § 50-15-1 to -4 (1998). "The Public Lawsuits Act gives courts the
authority to require a bond of any party who opposes a public improvement project in a
public lawsuit." 271 Ga. at 404, 519 S.E.2d at 667.
115. Id. at 403, 519 S.E.2d at 666. The municipal development authority had issued
notes to purchase 400 acres of land for an industrial park. Environmental regulations
rendered the land unsuitable for industrial development. In order to pay off the notes, the
development authority sought to issue revenue bonds to finance a public golf course on the
land. The proceeds from the bonds would be used to pay off the notes, to design and
construct the golf course, and to satisfy the bonds. Id. at 404, 519 S.E.2d at 666. "Ifthe
project's operating revenues are insufficient to pay for the expenses of operating the golf
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trial court's validation of the bonds. They also challenged the judge's
order (under the Public Lawsuits Act) that intervenors post a surety
bond to cover the authority's costs and damages during the appeal."'
In reviewing the latter challenge, the supreme court emphasized the
Act's restricted application to "non-meritorious or frivolous litigation."" 7 Because the intervenors sought to raise "meritorious claims"
regarding the propriety of the authority's proposed contracts and project,
the court invalidated the judge's order as an abuse of discretion." 8
Proceeding to a review of the proposals themselves, the court held the
golf course to be neither a "sports facilit[y]"" 9 nor a "project" to
develop "trade, commerce, [or] industry."12 ° Accordingly, the court
concluded, the undertaking "violates both the Georgia Constitution and
the Development Authority Law."' 2 '

course and the debt service on the bonds, the city is obligated to pay both." Id., 519 S.E.2d
at 667.
116. Id. "The trial court found that the appeal will delay the issuance of the bonds and
prevent the authority from completing the golf course and retiring the notes .

. . ."

Id.

117. Id. at 406, 519 S.E.2d at 668. "Thus, while any lawsuit filed against a public
project may increase its costs, the act makes clear that the legislature intended to
discourage frivolous or non-meritorious challenges because their harm to the public purse
offsets any benefit." Id.
118. Id. Intervenors sought to determine "whether the proposed contracts meet the
constitutional requirements for intergovernmental contracts that are not subject to the
constitutional debt clause and whether the proposed golf course is a project that promotes
the development of trade, commerce, industry, and employment opportunities as required
under the constitution and statute." Id.
119. O.C.G.A. § 36-62-2(6)(H)(i) (2000).
[T]he term "sports facilities" refers to a stadium, coliseum, arena, or similar
structure used for professional and competitive sporting events and other largescale entertainment events. It does not mean a youth ballpark, tennis complex,
swimming pool, or golf course that is designed primarily to provide recreational
opportunities for local residents and taxpayers.
271 Ga. at 407, 519 S.E.2d at 669. The Georgia constitution authorizes enactment of the
Development Authority Law in art. IX, § 6, para. 3.
120. O.C.G.A. § 36-62-2(6)(N) (2000). "Despite charging admission fees in an attempt
to cover its operating expenses and debt service, the project is not a traditional business
enterprise conducted for profit and thus does not meet the definition of a trade, industry,
or commerce." 271 Ga. at 408, 519 S.E.2d at 669.
121. Id., 519 S.E.2d at 670. A dissenting opinion focused upon the majority's reversal
of the trial judge's order of the surety bond: "The fact that an appellate court may later
find merit where the trial court has found none does not mean that the trial court abused
its discretion in requiring an appeal bond." Id. at 409, 519 S.E.2d at 670 (Carley, J.,
dissenting).
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Zoning
Both appellate courts addressed procedural issues of zoning during the
survey period. The supreme court posed its issue as follows: "What
constitutes sufficient notice to the zoning authority of a challenge to the
constitutionality of an existing zoning classification as applied to
particular property?" 2 ' In answering that question, the court held
that such notice "does not have to meet a high standard of particularity"
and that only "fair notice" of a constitutional challenge is necessary. 23
Overruling a prior decision,'2 4 the court found sufficient particularity
in remarks by the property owner's representative at the council hearing
concerning aspects of the property and concluding that "the existing
zoning, I do not believe is really what you would call a constitutional
I.

zoning.125

The court of appeals confronted the failure of a municipal zoning
appeals board ("BZA") to respond to a property owner's appeal of a
zoning variance denial to the superior court. 126 Holding the superior
court's grant of a default judgment to constitute reversible error, the
court stated the trial judge's "sole function" was as follows: "[T]o
determine (1) whether there was any evidence to support the findings of
the BZA and (2) whether the BZA had abused its discretion." 27 The
board was not required to respond to the property owner's appeal, the
court concluded, and "the merits of the action
had already been
2 s
determined at the hearing held by the BZA."

122. Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 155, 516 S.E.2d 785, 786 (1999).
Plaintiffs sought to rezone certain property, and following a hearing, the municipal council
denied the application. Plaintiffs then filed suit asserting the present zoning classification
was unconstitutional. Id.
123. Id.
124. O.5. Advertising Co. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 438 S.E.2d 907 (1994).
125. 271 Ga. at 154, 516 S.E.2d at 786. The court reversed the trial judge's grant of
the city's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 156, 516 S.E.2d at 786.
126. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Kelly, 238 Ga. App. 799, 800, 520
S.E.2d 269, 270 (1999). The property owner sought a side yard set back variance; the
board of zoning appeals denied the variance; the owner appealed to the superior court; and,
due to administrative oversight, the board did not file a timely response. The trial judge
entered default judgment in favor of the property owner and reversed the zoning appeals
board's decision. Id.
127. Id. at 801, 520 S.E.2d at 271. "But here, notwithstanding the fact that an
appealable decision had been rendered by the BZA, the court imposed judgment by default
and decided the merits." Id.
128. Id. On remand, the court directed that unless the property owner proved "that
the [board] exceeded its discretionary powers or acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the
decision of the [board] must be affirmed." Id.

358

MERCER LAW REVIEW

II.

[Vol. 52

COUNTIES

A.

Home Rule
Home rule holds elaborate and historic significance in Georgia local
government law."9 Counties claim home rule status directly from the
Georgia Constitution via a provision delegating, inter alia, the power 13
to
enact ordinances amending local statutes on nonexcepted subjects.
That power emerged as the litigated issue in Krieger v. Walton County
Board of Commissioners,131 the most recent saga in an ongoing dispute
between a chairman and a board of commissioners. 3 ' More specifically, the chairman challenged the board's adoption of five ordinances that
amended local statutes so as to detract from the chairman's functions.
Because the board had directed his physical removal from the room
before voting on the ordinances,' 33 plaintiff attacked the measures as
unconstitutional home rule exercises.' 3 4 Reviewing the trial judge's
denial of plaintiff's position, the supreme court examined the precise
nature of each ordinance 3 5 and concluded that they "were duly
adopted under the procedures set out in [the home rule provision] of the
Georgia Constitution."'36 Sustaining the validity of the measures, the
court expressly rejected the chairman's unsupported assertion "that his
removal from the first board meeting and absence during the initial vote
somehow invalidated the board's adoption of the amendments."' 37

129. For extensive treatment of Georgia's local government home rule saga, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Home Rule System, 50 MERCER L. REV. 99 (1998).
130. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1.
131. 271 Ga. 791, 524 S.E.2d 461 (1999).
132. For an earlier episode, see Krieger v. Walton County Boardof Commissioners, 269
Ga. 678, 506 S.E.2d 366 (1998).
133. The chairman had attempted to prevent the reading of the ordinances and refused
to abide by the commissioners' vote that he be removed as presiding officer of the meeting.
The commissioners then had the chairman removed from the chamber by county deputy
sheriffs. 271 Ga. at 792, 524 S.E.2d at 462-63.
134. Id., 524 S.E.2d at 463.
135. Three ordinances pertained to personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the
governing authority. One ordinance deleted a portion of a local statute empowering the
chairman to supervise all county work. The final ordinance created the office of county
manager to be filled by the board. Id., 524 S.E.2d at 462.
136. Id. at 794, 524 S.E.2d at 464.
137. Id.
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Officers and Employees

County officers and employees were involved in a significant portion
of this year's local government litigation. One of the most basic issues
presented was that of Nash v. Pierce:... How many different positions
can an official hold?'39 More precisely, the court of appeals declared,
a general statute 4 ° prohibits any other county officer from also serving
as county treasurer.""
Consequently, a contrary local statute'42
could not validly designate as treasurer the chair of the county
commission.'
The supreme court viewed as equally clear the issue in Stubbs v.
Carpenter,'4 an action to mandamus the county's state court judge to
conduct civil trials. 145 Despite the extraordinary nature of mandamus 146 and conceding the considerable discretion inhering in the

138. 238 Ga. App. 466, 519 S.E.2d 462 (1999).
139. Id. at 467, 519 S.E.2d at 463. The case arose when three members of the county
commission sought injunctive relief against the commission chairman to prevent his
performing specified functions. Id. at 466, 519 S.E.2d at 462.
140. O.C.G.A. § 36-6-1(a) (2000).
141. 238 Ga. App. at 467, 519 S.E.2d at 463.
142. 1965 Ga. Laws 2670.
143. 238 Ga. App. at 467, 519 S.E.2d at 463. The court held that the general statute
'contradicted the local act and as a general law prevailed." Id. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the trial judge's determination against the commission chair. Id.
On the pervading issue of the tests by which the Georgia appellate courts determine the
validity of local statutes on subjects treated by general statutes, specifically focusing upon
the supreme court's latest announced "test," see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Supreme
Court and Local Government Law: Two Sheets to the Wind, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361
(1999).

Yet another period contest over right to office resulted in Bruce v. Maxwell, 270 Ga. 883,
515 S.E.2d 149 (1999), a quo warranto proceeding brought by a suspended county tax
commissioner who later resigned from the office in return for a nolle prosequi of criminal
charges. Id. at 883, 515 S.E.2d at 150. The supreme court reasoned as follows:
"[Petitioner] does not contest [her replacement's] qualifications. She simply asserts that
[the replacement] should not have been appointed as the interim tax commissioner because
she was suspended improperly .... [Tihat issue was rendered moot when [petitioner]
resigned her office." Id. For treatment of the extensive role of quo warranto in Georgia
local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE WRIT OF Quo WARRANTO IN
GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1987).

144. 271 Ga. 327, 519 S.E.2d 451 (1999).
145. Id. at 327, 519 S.E.2d at 451. Although the judge was statutorily required to hold
four terms of court each year and despite a backlog of cases, no civil cases had been tried
since 1966. Id.
146. "[Mlandamus does not lie in this case unless it can be said that the judge's
discretion has been grossly abused." Id. at 328, 519 S.E.2d at 452. On the more general
point of how frequently unsuccessful mandamus actions are in local government law, see
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judge,'4 7 the court nevertheless ordered the mandamus. 148 "We hold
that the judge's refusal to schedule civil cases for trial for more than two
years 14is9 a gross abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this
case."
Several of the contests touched upon matters of compensation. In
Dudley v. Rowland,'5 0 a part-time county chief magistrate declared
himself a full-time magistrate and sought to mandamus the commissioners to pay the commensurate salary.'5 ' Because the petitioner worked
full-time hours, the supreme court held that he must be paid the salary
specified by general statute.1 2 Declaring the commissioners without
power to reduce that salary, 153 the court asserted that "[a]ny change
in compensation for county magistrates can be effected only by a local
act of the General Assembly."' 54
Similar compensation concerns prompted the county tax commissioner's action in Brown v. Liberty County,"5 claiming entitlement to fees
or commissions in addition to her salary and attacking the salary statute

supra note 22.
147. "It is also clear that the judge is vested with broad discretion in that regard." 271
Ga. at 328, 519 S.E.2d at 452.
148. Id.
149. Id. "The petition for mandamus should have been granted." Id. The court thus
reversed the trial court's refusal to issue the mandamus. Id.
For a survey period case in which the court of appeals would not intervene in judicial
matters, see Kelly v.State, 238 Ga. App. 691, 520 S.E.2d 32 (1999). There, defendant
sought recusal of the trial judge in a prosecution against defendant for attacking the wife
of a county commissioner, on grounds that the commissioners paid supplemental salaries
to the judges in the county. Id. at 691, 520 S.E.2d at 34. The court held that under
neither the statutes nor the Code of Judicial Conduct was the recusal necessary: "In the
absence of any particular reason to suspect bias on the part of the trial judge in this case,
we do not believe that the judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned simply
because the victim's husband is a county commissioner." Id. at 693, 520 S.E.2d at 36.
150. 271 Ga. 176, 517 S.E.2d 326 (1999).
151. Id. at 176, 517 S.E.2d at 326. Petitioner made the charge on grounds that the
work load required a full-time officer. The commissioners responded by reducing the
magistrate's work schedule back to part-time while maintaining his hourly rate and level
of pay. Id. at 177, 517 S.E.2d at 327.
152. Id. "The statutory distinction between working in a full-time capacity and a parttime capacity is determined solely by the number of hours served by the chief magistrate
in fulfilling the responsibilities of the judicial office." Id.
153. "Any reduction in compensation for a chief magistrate who serves in a full-time
capacity is contrary to the express language of OCGA § 15-10-23(a) ...." Id.
154. Id.
Additionally, the court held that a reduction of compensation during
petitioner's term of office would violate GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, para. 5. Id.
155. 271 Ga. 634, 522 S.E.2d 466 (1999).
MISCASTING MANDAMUS,
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as unconstitutionally vague. 5 6 Rejecting her attack, the supreme court
held that when construed in harmony with other measures,'57 the
salary statute 158 controlled the case. 159 That statute prevailed over
a local enactment that plaintiff relied upon 16 and precluded additional
fees under other general statutes.' 61 Consequently, 62
the court affirmed
the county's partial summary judgment in the case.
Financial concerns, albeit retirement benefits, likewise generated the
action by county court reporters in Miller v. Clayton County" to
mandamus inclusion, for purposes of retirement benefits, sums plaintiffs
received for services other than taking testimony in felony cases."
The supreme court reviewed the arrangements under which those other
services (e.g., preparing transcripts for indigent defendants, transcribing
bond, and forfeiture hearings) were rendered6 5 and rejected plaintiffs'
claims.
In performing those services, the court held that the court
reporters "occupied the status of independent contractors in regard to
the compensation they received in addition to their annual base
salaries." 7 So considered, that conipensation need not be included by
the county in determining plaintiffs' retirement benefits.'

156. Id. at 634, 522 S.E.2d at 466. "The county's position was that OCGA § 48-5-183
controlled, and entitled [the Commissioner] to receive only her salary unsupplemented by
any fees or commissions." Id.
157. In effect, the court employed the statutory construction technique, inparimateria.
For analysis of that technique, in the context of Georgia case law, see Statutory
Construction in Georgia: The Doctrine of In Pari Materia, in R. PERRY SENTELL, JR.,
STUDIES IN GEORGIA STATUTORY LAw 259 (1997).
158. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-183 (1999).
159. 271 Ga. at 634, 522 S.E.2d at 466.
160. 1975 Ga. Laws 3862.
161. 271 Ga. at 635, 522 S.E.2d at 467. "For her entire tenure, her statutorily
mandated minimum salary under OCGA § 48-5-183 has been higher than that provided
in the local act, as well as higher than the maximum salary permitted in order to receive
fees pursuant to OCGA §§ 40-2-33 and 48-5-180." Id.
162. Id. at 636, 522 S.E.2d at 467. "Therefore, the trial court correctly granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the County." Id.
163. 271 Ga. 135, 518 S.E.2d 402 (1999).
164. Id.
165. Plaintiffs "were not hired by the County and cannot be fired by the County;" they
"take no instruction from the commissioners or any County employee; ... the County does
not set their hours of work, the sequence of their work, or the amount they work; and ...
[they] are not required to render their services personally." Id. at 137, 518 S.E.2d at 404.
166. Id. at 136, 518 S.E.2d at 403.
167. Id. at 137, 518 S.E.2d at 404.
168. Id. at 135, 518 S.E.2d at 403. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's denial of
plaintiffs' petition for a mandamus against the county. Id. at 137, 518 S.E.2d at 404.
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The court of appeals took two occasions to remind superior courts of
their limited ("any evidence") review standard when considering county
employee appeals from decisions by the state board of workers'
6 9 the trial judge reversed the
compensation. In Bibb County v. Short,"
board's denial of compensation for an employee's psychological impairment allegedly caused by physical injury on the job.17° Reversing the
reversal, the court of appeals emphasized the board's reliance upon an
independent board-certified psychiatrist's examination.'
Given "some
medical evidence supporting the board's decision," the court held that
the superior court 72erred in "substituting its factual findings for those of
the State Board."

The court rendered a similar decision in Bibb County v. Higgins,7'
involving a county employee's death from a stroke that allegedly resulted
from job-related stress and exertion.7 4 Reviewing the evidence relied
upon by the state board in denying compensation,'75 the court declared
76
the evidence sufficient to support the board's determination. 177
Accordingly, "the superior court was without authority to reverse it."

Finally, in Ianicelli v. McNeely 17 the supreme court rejected a
county citizen's contention that members of the school board, each of
whom was married to a school system employee, were in violation of
Georgia's constitutional admonition that "'[piublic officers are the
trustees and servants of the people and are at all times amenable to

169. 238 Ga. App. 291, 518 S.E.2d 484 (1999).
170. Id. at 291, 518 S.E.2d at 484. Plaintiff employee claimed that the psychological
injury resulted from an injury to his foot received on the job and for which physical injury
plaintiff was awarded workers' compensation. Id., 518 S.E.2d at 484-85.
171. Id. at 292, 518 S.E.2d at 485. That witness testified that plaintiff's "psychological
profile was long-standing and preceded the ...

accident." Id.

172. Id. at 291, 518 S.E.2d at 484. The superior court had relied upon other medical
evidence "attributing [the employee's] psychological disability in part to the anger he
developed over the work assignment that led to his physical injury." The court thus erred,
the court of appeals held, "in not accepting [the State Board's] finding and in reversing the
State Board's decision." Id. at 292, 518 S.E.2d at 485.
173. 241 Ga. App. 161, 526 S.E.2d 379 (1999).
174. Id. at 161, 526 S.E.2d at 380. Claimant alleged the employee's stroke to have
resulted from severe and uncontrolled hypertension and that job-related stress contributed
to the hypertension causing the fatal stroke. Id.
175. The board had relied upon testimony of the county's medical expert to find that
there was insufficient credible evidence that the employee's stroke arose out of and in the
course of his employment with the county. Id. at 162, 526 S.E.2d at 380.
176. Id. at 163, 526 S.E.2d at 381. "Construing the evidence most favorably to the
board's award as we are required to do, . . . we conclude that the board weighed the
evidence; [and] there was evidence to support the award ...

177. Id.
178. 272 Ga. 234, 527 S.E.2d 189 (2000).

"

Id.
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them.'"' 79 The court distinguished prior trustee decisions 80 and
characterized plaintiff's position as "based largely upon speculation." 8 '
Affirming dismissal of the action, the court rebuffed the notion that "an
elected school board official whose family members are employed by the
local school system acts in violation of [his] public duty merely by
participating in decisions affecting school operations."182
C. Elections
The administrative success of county elections depends in no small
part on the efficiency of the county's Chief Voting Registrar. In Collier
v. Board of Commissioners,"3 Pike County commissioners alleged that
a registrar's inefficiency justified her removal from office by the superior
court." Reviewing the registrar's appeal from the judge's "removal for
cause" order,'
the court of appeals recounted evidence that two
"voided elections were directly caused by [the registrar's] failure to follow
the law and properly administer the duties of her office." 8 6 That
evidence, the court concluded, sufficiently supported the trial judge's
order of removal for cause.' 87

179. Id. at 236, 527 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 1).
180. See, e.g., Dunaway v. City of Marietta, 251 Ga. 727, 308 S.E.2d 823 (1983);
Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543, 291 S.E.2d 524 (1982). In
these cases, the court asserted, "there was evidence that a public officer had definitely
benefitted financially (or definitely stood to benefit financially) as a result of simply
performing their official duties." 272 Ga. at 236, 527 S.E.2d at 191.
181. Id. "We do not believe that our State Constitution's 'public trust' language is
intended to effectuate such a sweeping and all-encompassing prohibition against the
valuable right to seek election to local school boards." Id. at 237, 527 S.E.2d at 192.
182. Id. The court emphasized, however, that "[s]hould it be shown that a school board
member has violated his or her duty to ensure the integrity of local school system
operations by intentionally acting in order to further of their spouse's pecuniary gain (and,
hence, their own), they would indeed have breached the public's trust." Id.
183. 240 Ga. App. 605, 524 S.E.2d 292 (1999).
184. Id. at 605, 524 S.E.2d at 293. The commissioners brought their action for removal
under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-212, which provides that the senior superior court judge has the
right to remove a registrar "at any time for cause after notice and hearing." O.C.G.A. § 212-212 (1998).
185. The registrar conceded notice and hearing and contested "only whether the
evidence was sufficient to remove her 'for cause.'" 240 Ga. App. at 605, 524 S.E.2d at 293.
186. Id. at 606, 524 S.E.2d at 293. One election had been voided because the names
of 58 voters were placed in the wrong district and they were denied the right to vote in the
proper district. The other election was voided because the chief registrar mishandled a
number of absentee votes. Id. at 605, 524 S.E.2d at 293.
187. Id. at 606, 524 S.E.2d at 294. The court reasoned that although few prior cases
addressed the issue of "cause" under the statute, the superior court's findings should be
upheld if there is "any evidence" to support them. Id.
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Crucial to a candidate's chance of election is his inclusion on the
election ballot. In Gathercoal v. Purcell, s8 plaintiff petitioned to
mandamus the board of elections to place his name on the ballot as an
independent candidate for the county board of commissioners. 8 9
Summarily affirming denial of plaintiff's petition, the supreme court
observed that "3,344 of the 4,511 signatures on [plaintiff's] petition were
on pages notarized by a circulator."9 ° Accordingly, the court held that
the elections board "correctly disqualified [those]
signatures" and that
191
the trial judge properly disallowed mandamus.
D. Openness
A vital facet of "openness in government" implicates the concept of
meetings by a local governing authority conducted in the public eye.'92
To assure the conduct of such meetings, Georgia's Open and Public
Meetings Act provides that unexcepted meetings by a county governing
authority are to be open to the public.' 93 In Camden County v. Haddock,"9 a former finance director charged the county commission with
violation of that Act in respect to her discharge. 9 ' Assessing that
plaintiff's claim depended on her assertion that the commissioners fired
her, the supreme court found the evidence insufficient.'
Rather, the
court explained that evidence revealed that the commissioners took no
official action on plaintiff's employment and that she was fired by the
county administrator based on what he perceived to be the commission's
consensus.'9 7 Additionally, under the Act's exception for "personnel

188. 271 Ga. 26, 517 S.E.2d 780 (1999).
189. Id. at 26, 517 S.E.2d at 780.
190. Id. Such action, the court asserted, violated its decision in Poppell v. Lanier, 270
Ga. 11, 507 S.E.2d 721 (1998): "The rule set forth in Poppell is clear and easily
administered. Therefore, we decline ... to overrule it." 271 Ga. at 27, 517 S.E.2d at 780.
191. Id. at 26, 517 S.E.2d at 780.
192. For early background discussion of the "openness movement" in Georgia local
government law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness" in Local Government
Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97 (1978).
193. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 to -6 (1998 & Supp. 2000).
194. 271 Ga. 664, 523 S.E.2d 291 (1999).
195. Id. at 665, 523 S.E.2d at 292. Plaintiff also charged a violation of procedural due
process, but the court rejected that argument for the reason that she did not comply with
the time requirements of the county's personnel policy. Id. at 664, 523 S.E.2d at 292.
196. Id. at 666-67, 523 S.E.2d at 293.
197. Id. "[Tihe county administrator called [plaintiff] into his office and told her she
was fired based on what he perceived to be the consensus of the county commission." Id.
at 666, 523 S.E.2d at 293.
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matters,"'9 8 the court found no violation from the fact that commission
members discussed plaintiff's job performance at an earlier meeting. 199
E.

Regulation

County regulatory efforts 200 attracted litigation in Kitchens v.
Richmond County,20 ' an action to mandamus issuance of a building
permit.20 2 Because the evidence failed to show plaintiff's vested right
to a permit,2 3 the supreme court summarily denied the mandamus. 20 4 The county commission's prior conditional approval of a
permit, the court asserted, was insufficient: "The Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance provides that the Riverfront Development Review Board shall
review all development plans in the riverfront zone and that no building
permits shall be issued until the board has made a recommendation to

the commission. "205
Discretion in regulating alcoholic beverages 20 6 served the county well
in Bradshaw v. Dayton,207 an effort to mandamus the issuance of a
license for the retail sale of beer and wine. 28 Rejecting a due process
attack, the supreme court reached two conclusions relative to the county

198. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-3(6) (1998).
199. 271 Ga. at 667, 523 at 293. In an executive session prior to a vote to reprimand
the county administrator for an auditor's report of missing general county funds, one of the
commissioners remarked to the administrator that plaintiff "needed to go." Id. at 664, 523
S.E.2d at 292. The court held that the county was entitled to summary judgment on
plaintiffs claim under the Open Meetings Act. Id. at 667, 523 S.E.2d at 293.
200. For background on the issue of county regulation generally, see Discretion,supra
note 51; Reasoning By Riddle, supra note 51.
201. 271 Ga. 20, 515 S.E.2d 143 (1999).
202. Id. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at 144. Plaintiff developer sought a permit to build ten
townhouses on a riverfront lot, and the local government review board denied his proposal
as incompatible with existing development. Id.
203. Id. "A building permit must have been legally obtained and validly issued to
result in a vested right." Id.
204. Id. "To be entitled to mandamus, the petitioner must show there is a clear legal
right to the relief sought or there has been a gross abuse of discretion." Id. See
MISCASTING MANDAMUS, supra note 22.
205. 271 Ga. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at 144. "Finally, the county governing authority did not
abuse its discretion in referring the matter to the review board as required by law." Id.
at 21, 515 S.E.2d at 144. The court thus upheld the trial judge's denial of plaintiffs
petition. Id.
206. For background on county regulation of alcoholic beverages, see A Sobering
Vignette, supra note 51.
207. 270 Ga. 884, 514 S.E.2d 831 (1999).
208. Id. at 884, 514 S.E.2d at 832. The county commission had rejected plaintiffs
application on grounds that she did not meet the requirements for a "qualified location."
Id.
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ordinance's means of establishing "qualified [sales] locations." 2 9 First,
reliance upon the number of registered voters, rather than population,
"is not arbitrary in the constitutional sense."210 Second, distance
measurement from property lines, rather than buildings, "is not
arbitrary, illogical, or vague."21' Accordingly, the court declared the
ordinance "reasonably related to its goal of regulating the retail sale of
beer and wine."21 '
In Cafg Erotica, Inc. v. Peach County,"' the court again relied upon

two conclusions to sustain an ordinance prohibiting the sale and
consumption of alcoholic beverages in adult entertainment establishments. 2" 4 First, the county attorney's characterization of the ordinance
as an attempt to eliminate nude dancing did not detract from the
measure's content-neutral nature." 5 Second, the county need not
demonstrate its own experience with negative secondary effects of such
establishments; rather, it could rely upon the studies of other jurisdictions. 2"6 21Again,
therefore, the court affirmed a judgment of constitu7
tionality.
Finally, the court reached its regulatory limit in Thelen v. State,2 8
a challenge to a county ordinance prohibiting "any loud, unnecessary or
unusual sound or noise" that annoys others more than fifty feet
removed." 9 As criminally applied to the pilot of a helicopter who

209. Id.
210. Id. The ordinance limited "the number of qualified locations within each voting
district to one location for every 500 registered voters." Id.
211. Id. The ordinance specified a distance of 100 yards from churches, funeral homes,
schools, colleges, or other retail sellers of beer and wine. Id.
212. Id. at 885, 514 S.E.2d at 832. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's decision
upholding the validity of the ordinance. Id. at 884, 514 S.E.2d at 832.
213. 272 Ga. 47, 526 S.E.2d 56 (2000).
214. Id. at 47, 526 S.E.2d at 56. This was the third installment in the county's ongoing efforts. See Chambers v. Peach County, 266 Ga. 318, 467 S.E.2d 519 (1996);
Chambers v. Peach County, 268 Ga. 672, 492 S.E.2d 191 (1997).
215. 272 Ga. at 48, 526 S.E.2d at 57-58. "[Wle conclude that the statement of the
County Attorney, who was not on the Board of Commissioners and was not entitled to vote
for enactment of the ordinance, is not sufficient evidence to cause us to depart from our
ruling ... that the ordinance is content-neutral." Id.
216. Id. at 49, 526 S.E.2d at 58. "A local government may rely upon the studies
conducted by other jurisdictions as long as the evidence it relies upon is reasonably
believed to be related to the problem the city is attempting to address." Id.
217. Id. at 50, 526 S.E.2d at 58. "[Tlhe trial court did not err when it... granted [the]
County's motion for summary judgment." Id.
218. 272 Ga. 81, 526 S.E.2d 60 (2000).
219. Id. at 81, 526 S.E.2d at 61. Plaintiff appealed his conviction under the ordinance
in the trial court. Id.
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landed and took off from his dock,22 ° the court held that the language
of the ordinance suffered from undue vagueness. 221 First, "it does not
define a specific context in which it applies, thereby magnifying its
inherent flaws."222 Second, the court reasoned that the standard of
conduct specified "'is dependent upon the individualized sensitivity of
each complainant.'" 223 Finally, the court assured that the county could
perfect a "more clearly worded and narrowly drawn ordinance,"
protecting its citizens from noises affecting their health or safety, and
nonetheless "insuring an ascertainable standard of guilt for due process
requirements. 2 24
F

Contracts
Georgia statutory law has long required that all county contracts must
be in writing. 225 The court of appeals deemed that requirement
decisive in the case of Waters v. Glynn County,22 ' an illegally terminat227
ed department head's action against the county for back pay.

Although conceding that the Georgia Constitution waives the county's
sovereign immunity in contract,228 the court held that "the mere
acceptance of a written offer of employment for an indefinite term ...

220. "Because [plaintiffs] vagueness challenge does not involve First Amendment
freedoms, we must limit our decision to the application of the ordinance in light of the
conduct to which it is applied in this case." Id.
221. Id. at 82, 526 S.E.2d at 62.
222. Id. "By prohibiting 'any . . . unnecessary or unusual sound or noise which ...
annoys ... others,' the ordinance here fails to provide the requisite clear notice and
sufficiently definite warning of the conduct that is prohibited." Id. (quoting Fratiello v.
Manusco, 653 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I. 1987)).
223. Id. at 83, 526 S.E.2d at 62 (quoting Nichols v. City of Gulfport, 589 So. 2d 1280,
1284 (Miss. 1991)). The court reasoned that "[w]hether the noise of a helicopter takeoff or
landing is 'unnecessary,' 'unusual,' or 'annoying' to a neighbor more than 50 feet away
'certainly depends upon the ear of the listener.'" Id.
224. Id.
Accordingly, the court reversed plaintiffs convictions of violating the
ordinance. Id. See "AscertainableStandards"versus "UnbridledDiscretion," supra note
51.
225. O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1 (2000). For treatment of this statute, its history, and its
evolution by the Georgia courts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., County Contracts in Georgia:
'Written and Entered", 32 MERCER L. REV. 283 (1980).
226. 237 Ga. App. 438, 514 S.E.2d 680 (1999).
227. Id. at 438, 514 S.E.2d at 681. Prior litigation had determined plaintiffs
termination to be illegal. See Glynn County v. Waters, 268 Ga. 500, 503, 491 S.E.2d 370,
373 (1997).
228. GA. CONST. art. I § 2, para. 9(c). "Thus, the defense of sovereign immunity has
been waived for actions arising out of written contracts entered into by a county." 237 Ga.
App. at 439, 514 S.E.2d at 682 (emphasis in original).
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does not create an enforceable written contract."229 Consequently, the
court held, "no enforceable contract exists."" °
Yet another historic limitation upon local government's contracting
capabilities inheres in the state constitution's prohibition against
governmental gratuities. 31' This limitation reared its countenance in
Swanberg v. City of 7ybee Island,2"2 an action testing title to land
conveyed by a county to a municipality.23 3 In reviewing the quitclaim
deed in issue, the supreme court called attention to an "express direction
that the land shall be used solely by the Marine Rescue Squadron [MRS]
...

for rescue missions in the [municipal] area," and noted that "MRS

has continuously used the property in such manner."2"4 That direction,
the court reasoned, saved the contract and the municipal use of the land
from plaintiffs' charge of illegal gratuity: "No gratuity is involved where
the municipality
is receiving ample consideration for use of the
23 5
property."

Once entered into, successful county contracts depend upon acceptable
performance by the other contracting party. Ruby-Collins, Inc. v. Cobb
County. featured an instance lacking these ingredients: a county's
237
breach of contract action for work on its water reclamation facility
and the contractor's counterclaim for removal from the list of prequali-

229. Id., 514 S.E.2d at 683. "[Plaintiff] asserts he had a written contract with the
county by virtue of his acceptance of the county's written offer of employment." Id. The
following quote only appears in the official reporter. Moreover, the court continued,
plaintiff "has failed to establish that his contract was entered on the minutes of the...
County Commission."
230. Id.
The court thus affirmed the trial judge's denial of plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 441, 514 S.E.2d at 684.
231. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(a).
232. 271 Ga. 23, 518 S.E.2d 114 (1999).
233. Id. at 23, 518 S.E.2d at 115. Plaintiffs, owners of land abutting the right-of-way
in issue, argued that the county had possessed and conveyed only an easement in the land
that, when no longer used by the municipality as a right-of-way, reverted to adjacent
property owners. Id. at 24, 518 S.E.2d at 115. The supreme court construed the interest
owned and conveyed as a fee rather than an easement and thus not subject to a
reversionary interest. Id. at 25, 518 S.E.2d at 117.
234. Id. at 26, 518 S.E.2d at 117.
235. Id. "Since it was shown that MRS uses the property in exchange for providing
valuable rescue services to the area, the trial court correctly awarded summary judgment
to [the municipality] on the issue of an impermissible gratuity." Id.
236. 237 Ga. App. 517, 515 S.E.2d 187 (1999).
237. "The County contended that the specially designed incinerator, installed by the
subcontractor..., did not perform to the County's satisfaction." Id. at 518, 515 S.E.2d at
188-89.
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fled eligible bidders for future county projects.238 Reviewing the trial
judge's summary judgment against the counterclaim,23 s the court of
appeals emphasized the county's statutory authority24 ° to allow
contracts for public projects and to "'reject any and all bids.'" 241 "It
follows," the court asserted, "that no particular prospective bidder has
any legitimate claim of entitlement to be able to bid on any future
contract the government may let."24 2 Consequently, defendant contractor possessed "no protected property interest in remaining on a list of
bidders prequalified to bid on future public works conpotential
243
tracts."

G. Roads
Statutory law permits a county to abandon a public road that serves
"no substantial public purpose."244 A county's abandonment decision
under this statute attracted the complaint in Torbett v. Butts County245
of a landowner whose property adjoined the road in issue. Arguing that
the road's disuse resulted from the county's failure to maintain and
repair it, plaintiff petitioned to enjoin the county's abuse of discretion.246 In review of the matter, the supreme court found that disuse
had resulted not from the condition of the road itself, "but from the fact
that a bridge on the road was impassible." 247 Moreover, the court
concluded, "the county commission's consideration of the economic factors
involved in the decision whether to abandon the road was proper and did

238.

Id. at 517-18, 515 S.E.2d at 188.

Defendant contractor contended that under

U.S.C. § 1983, the county had committed an unconstitutional "taking without due process
of law ...amounting to a 'blacklisting' of" defendant. Id.
239. Defendant argued that "the trial court erred in failing to recognize a property or
liberty interest protected by due process in not being removed from the list of contractors
pre-qualified to bid on County public works." Id. at 518, 515 S.E.2d at 189.
240. O.C.G.A. § 36-10-2.1 (2000).
241. 237 Ga. App. at 519, 515 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-10-2.1 (2000)).
242. Id. at 520, 515 S.E.2d at 189-90. "The existence of such a discretion to reject bids
is incompatible with an objectively reasonable expectation of legitimate claim of
entitlement by any prospective bidder." Id., 515 S.E.2d at 189 (emphasis added).
243. Id., 515 S.E.2d at 190. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's summary
judgment against the contractor's counterclaim. Id.
244. O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1) (1996).
245. 271 Ga. 521, 520 S.E.2d 684 (1999).
246. Id. at 522, 520 S.E.2d at 685. Plaintiff argued that the road would be used if the
county replaced a bridge, which had been destroyed some twenty years earlier and that
"the abandonment of the road solely to avoid the expense of a new bridge was an abuse of
discretion." Id.
247. Id. That fact, the court held, distinguished its decision in Cherokee County v.
McBride, 262 Ga. 460, 421 S.E.2d 530 (1992), in which disuse had resulted from the
condition of the road itself. 271 Ga. at 522, 520 S.E.2d at 685.
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the court
Accordingly,
not constitute an abuse of discretion." 248
249
affirmed the trial judge's decision for the county.
H.

Taxation

Local option sales taxes propelled issues to the appellate courts on two
occasions during the survey period. In Thornton 6. Clarke County School
District,25 ° county residents and taxpayers sought to prevent the school
district from constructing a new high school. Plaintiffs maintained that
defendant had failed to file an environmental effects report and that it
lacked authority under the sales tax referendum to demolish an existing
school or to spend more than an estimated amount.251' As for plaintiffs'
first contention, the supreme court simply read the Georgia Environmental Policy Act's 252 coverage of "any department, board, bureau, commission, authority, or other agency of the state"253 to exclude county school
districts. 4 Accordingly, the district was not required to file the
environmental effects report. Second, the court emphasized the "broad
discretion" possessed by the board 25 5 and observed that the "estimated
cost" of a new high school came not from the referendum but from the
board's meetings with the public. 256 "Because none of the school
board's plans violates the referendum, we find no violation of law or an
abuse of discretion if the school board were to demolish the existing high

248. Id.
249. Id. at 523, 520 S.E.2d at 685. The court expressly relied upon its earlier decision
in Smith v.Board of Comm'rs., 264 Ga. 316, 444 S.E.2d 775 (1994). 271 Ga. at 522, 520
S.E.2d at 685.
250. 270 Ga. 633, 514 S.E.2d 11 (1999).
251. Id. at 634,514 S.E.2d at 12. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, mandamus,
and injunctive relief. Id.
252. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-16-1 to -8 (1996).
253. Id. § 12-16-3(5). "Construing all of the component parts of the statute together
leads to the conclusion that the Act was not intended to apply to local school districts." 270
Ga. at 635, 514 S.E.2d at 13.
254. Id. at 634, 514 S.E.2d at 12. The court conceded that its construction of this
statute was in tension with its interpretations in the area of sovereign immunity but
"decline[d] to extend our broad reading of that doctrine to construction of this statute." Id.
at 635, 514 S.E.2d at 12.
255. This discretion came from the constitutional amendment authorizing the sales tax
referendum for educational purposes. GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6, para. 4.
256. 270 Ga. at 634, 514 S.E.2d at 12. "While the referendum addressed neither the
estimated $18 million for construction of a new high school, nor plans for the existing high
school, these matters were discussed by school board members at public meetings." Id. at
635, 514 S.E.2d at 13.
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school or to spend more than the estimated $18 million for construction
of a new school."257
The court of appeals operated from a more restrictive perspective in
Shadix v. Carroll County,2 5 involving a special purpose county sales
and use tax. There, the referendum stated that the tax was to raise $34
million for a period of four years for road work and for a period of five
years for capital improvements. When the tax yielded the specified
amount of money in fewer than the years stated, plaintiffs sought to
enjoin further collections.259 Passing on the authorizing statute as it
then existed,2" the court asserted that "the voters approved a tax
which would end within four years and five years, or upon the collection
of $34 million dollars."2"1 Once that amount had been collected,
the
2 62
court held, "the county was obligated to cease its taxation."
L

Liability
Any negligence action, including one against a local government,
requires that plaintiff prove defendant's violation of a duty, a requirement particularly problematic when defendant is charged only with
nonfeasance rather than misfeasance.2 63 Absent a special relationship,
a defendant (including a local government) owes no duty to prevent a
third party from causing harm to another. Under the historic "public

257. Id. at 635-36, 514 S.E.2d at 13. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the
board was responsible for its representations under O.C.G.A. § 36-82-1(d): That statute
'pertains specifically to bonded debt, whereas the referendum at issue in this case involves
sales and use taxes. And the constitutional provision authorizing the present referendum
does not contain a similar provision regarding adherence to statements of intentions." 270
Ga. at 636, 514 S.E.2d at 13. The court thus sustained the trial judge's dismissal of

plaintiffs' complaint. Id.
258. 239 Ga. App. 191, 521 S.E.2d 99 (1999).
259. Id. at 192, 521 S.E.2d at 101. The tax collections began in April 1994, and the
specified amount of money had been raised by May 1998. The county contended that the
five-year period specified on the ballot was controlling, regardless of the amount of money
raised. Id.
260. O.C.G.A. § 48-8-112(b)(3) (1995 & Supp. 2000). The court noted that under an
amendment to this statute, not controlling in this case, "all SPLOST taxes clearly
terminate when the maximum amount is raised." 239 Ga. at 195, 521 S.E.2d at 102-03.
That amendment, the court said, applied only to referendums adopted after April 14, 1997.
Id.
261. Id., 521 S.E.2d at 103 (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 196, 521 S.E.2d at 103. The court employed the statutory construction
maxim of strictly construing tax statutes against the taxing authority. Id. at 195, 521
S.E.2d at 103. The court thus reversed the trial judge's decision in favor of the county. Id.
at 197, 521 S.E.2d at 104.
263. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 373 (5th ed. 1984).
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duty doctrine," therefore, a local government owes its protections to the
public at large, not to any particular individual.6
Having announced its public duty doctrine in 1993, the Georgia
Supreme Court found no local government duty to provide police
protection against the acts and omissions of third parties.265 Five
years later, the court of appeals held in Coffey v. Brooks County. that
the doctrine did not apply when county police officers failed to protect
the public "from hazardous conditions caused by the weather rather than
by a third party."2 67 Taking the case on certiorari (under the style of
Rowe v. Coffey

26),

the supreme court, via a combination of two two-

justice opinions, reversed.2 69 Declaring the doctrine's applicability to
county law enforcement officers who failed properly to inspect and
barricade a public road washed out by a sudden rainstorm, the court
rejected claims by citizens who wrecked their automobiles on the
road.
If there
was no duty, the court held, there could be no negli27 1
gence liability.
In addition to general negligence limitations, of course, Georgia
counties also enjoy basic immunity to tort responsibility.27 2 Subject
only to specific acts of waiver by the General Assembly, counties receive
the constitution's express grant of sovereign immunity.273 The legislature enacted a statute of explicit waiver in 1955 when it authorized
local governments to obtain liability insurance for the "ownership,
maintenance, operation, or use of any motor vehicle."274 That statute
constituted the basis of Butler v. Dawson County,275 an action for

264. See 2 SANDRA STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 35.06 (1998).
265. City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 30, 426 S.E.2d 861,864 (1993). For treatment
of the public duty doctrine in Georgia to this point, see Georgia'sPublic Duty Doctrine,
supra note 92.
266. 231 Ga. App. 886, 500 S.E.2d 341 (1998).
267. Id. at 888, 500 S.E.2d at 345.
268. 270 Ga. 715, 515 S.E.2d 375 (1999). For detailed treatment of all four opinions
in Rowe, see Georgia's Public Duty Doctrine, supra note 92.
269. 270 Ga. at 716, 515 S.E.2d at 377.
270. Id. "We ... conclude that the scope of police protection for the purposes of the
public duty doctrine includes the activities undertaken by [the officers] in this case." Id.
271. Id. For discussion of the entire "public duty doctrine" in Georgia local government
law, see Georgia'sPublic Duty Doctrine, supra note 92.
272. For perspective, see The "Crisis"Conundrum, supra note 70; The Summer of'92,
supra note 70.
273. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(e). Additionally, O.C.G.A. § 36-1-4 provides that
counties are not liable for any cause of action unless made so by statute.
274. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (1996). For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort
Liability Insurancein Georgia Local Government Law, 24 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1973).
275. 238 Ga. App. 808, 518 S.E.2d 430 (1999).
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plaintiff's injury in a collision with a DUI arrestee released by the
county prior to the accident. Because the county had purchased motor
vehicle liability insurance, plaintiff contended that the county was
responsible for failing to detain the arrestee and for permitting her to
drive." 6 The court of appeals rejected plaintiff's argument: The car
was neither owned by the county, nor was it being operated by an
"authorized officer, agent, servant, attorney, or employee in the
performance of his [or her] official duties."277 Accordingly, the court
held, there had been no waiver of county immunity under the insurance
statute.7
Chamlee v. Henry County Board of Education19 presented a deviously distinguishable motor vehicle instance. There, plaintiffs sued the
school board for injuries to their son who was hurt while riding in a
faculty member's car being test driven as part of the son's automotive
shop class. 28 0

Because the car was neither owned by the county nor

being driven by the shop instructor, defendant maintained that its
insurance did not operate to waive immunity."" Holding neither
factor conclusive, the court of appeals reversed summary judgment for
defendant.2"2 Overruling a prior decision,28 3 the court declared it

276. Id. at 810, 518 S.E.2d at 432. Plaintiff alleged that the arrestee was intoxicated
and driving negligently at the time of the collision, that she possessed no driver's license,
that county officials permitted her to leave the jail to drive herself to the doctor, and that
the county possessed liability insurance. Id. at 809, 518 S.E.2d at 431.
277. Id. at 810, 518 S.E.2d at 432. "There were no allegations that [the arrestee] was
required to report back to jail or that anyone would follow up her activities once she was
released." Id. at 811, 518 S.E.2d at 432.
278. Id. The waiver of immunity pleading prevailed in Maxwell v. Cronan, 241 Ga.
App. 491, 527 S.E.2d 1 (1999), an action alleging the county school district's possession of
liability insurance by one injured in a collision with defendant's school bus. Id. at 491-92,
527 S.E.2d at 1-2. Reversing a judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants, the court
of appeals held plaintiffs allegaiion "sufficient to put the onus on the defendant school
district to submit an affidavit denying the existence of a motor vehicle liability policy." Id.
at 492, 527 S.E.2d at 2. Failure to negate immunity waiver, the court held, disentitled the
school district to a judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 493, 527 S.E.2d at 2.
279. 239 Ga. App. 183, 521 S.E.2d 78 (1999).
280. Id. at 183, 521 S.E.2d at 79. The students received hands-on instruction by
working on cars owned by students and teachers, and plaintiffs' son was injured in a
teacher's car being test driven either by the son or another student. Id.
281. Id. at 184, 521 S.E.2d at 80.
282. Id. at 189, 521 S.E.2d at 83.
283. The court said that Blumsack v. Bartow County, 223 Ga. App. 392, 477 S.E.2d 642
(1996), "held that sovereign immunity is waived only if the negligent act arises from the
'use' of the vehicle, as opposed to 'ownership, maintenance, or operation,'" and 'there could
be a waiver only if the [county] official is the person using the vehicle." 239 Ga. App. at
187-88, 521 S.E.2d at 82 (quoting Blumsack, 223 Ga. App. at 396, 477 S.E.2d at 645-46).
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unnecessary that a governmental official must be personally driving the
automobile.2" Rather, the court held, the insurance statute waived
defendant's immunity if the car was being "used" by the shop instructor
in connection with his teaching of the automotive shop class." 5
Another exception to sovereign immunity inheres in Georgia counties'
traditional liability for the creation or maintenance of a nuisance.2 6
Plaintiffs successfully employed this exception in Fielder v. Rice
Construction Co.,287 an action against the county by homeowners
evicted for failure to remedy their septic system. Plaintiffs structured
their nuisance claim on proof that the county knew of potential drainage
problems on plaintiffs' lot, yielded to pressure to allow substandard
septic tank conditions to be approved, and subsequently failed to require
the contractor to correct the problem. 28" Those facts, the court of
appeals concluded, sufficiently raised a jury question on the county
health department's liability for a nuisance. 28' The "creation, power,
and control over the cause of the nuisance that interfered with [plaintiffs'] right to use, enjoy, and dispose of the property without abatement
cause[d] the Health Department to be potentially liable."290

284. 239 Ga. App. at 187, 521 S.E.2d at 81. "It was error for the trial court to grant
summary judgment to the Board solely on the grounds that sovereign immunity was not
waived because a government official was not personally operating the vehicle at the time
of the accident." Id. at 188-89, 521 S.E.2d at 82.
285. Id. at 188, 521 S.E.2d at 82. The court said that "an issue of fact remains with
regard to [the shop instructor's] use of the car in the performance of his official duties, i.e.,
in connection with his teaching of automotive shop class." Id., 521 S.E.2d at 82-83.
In another survey period case, Hancock v. Bryan County Board of Education, 240 Ga.
App 622, 522 S.E.2d 661 (1999), plaintiff boarded a school bus to discuss her grandson's
suspension from riding the bus and was injured as she disembarked. Id. at 622, 522 S.E.2d
at 663. Affirming summary judgment for the bus driver and school board in plaintiffs
action for negligence, the court of appeals held that the bus was not a motor common
carrier and that plaintiff was not a passenger. Id. at 626, 522 S.E.2d at 665.
286. For treatment of the Georgia county's liability in nuisance, see Nuisance or Not?,
supra note 89.
287. 239 Ga. App. 362, 522 S.E.2d 13 (1999).
288. Id. at 364, 522 S.E.2d at 16. Plaintiffs charged that at the developer's protests
against the original engineer's unacceptable soil tests on the lot, the county health
department assigned another engineer to the job who provided an acceptable test. The
county then approved the lots for septic use and allowed the developer to build. Later,
plaintiffs purchased their home on the lot, experienced sewage problems, and charged that
the health department failed to have the developer correct the problem before its builder's
warranties expired. Then, the health department evicted plaintiffs from their home for
failure to remedy the septic problem. Id. at 362, 522 S.E.2d at 14.
289. Id. at 365, 522 S.E.2d at 16. The court thus reversed the trial judge's summary
judgment for the health department. Id. at 368, 522 S.E.2d at 18.
290. Id. at 367, 522 S.E.2d at 17.
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An effective bar to litigation against a local government is the
291
plaintiff's prior valid promise not to bring it. Benson v. Carter
featured such a promise by a teacher who agreed "that if she were
'nonrenewed' priorto accepting a school year contract with the [defendant] school district for the fourth consecutive year, she would not make
any claims against the defendants for wrongful termination or institute
any litigation."292 In her subsequent action for wrongful termination,
plaintiff charged defendants with fraudulent inducement.293 The court
of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the school district by
reasoning that "there can be no breach of the implied covenant of good
faith where a party to a contract has done 294
what the provisions of the
contract expressly give him the right to do."
Plaintiffs of the survey period also directed their claims against county
officers and employees.295 Adams v. Hazelwood296 featured a student's action against a high school coach who assigned the student to
a work detail (cutting weeds with a pair of scissors) for destruction of

A nuisance does not arise solely from approval of construction projects which
increase surface water runoff. However, such negligent approval is a factor in
maintaining such nuisance, because the Health Department chose to act by
approving the construction project, which gave rise to a nuisance resulting from
the ground water and the failure of the septic field to percolate. The Health
Department acted concurrently with [the developer] in creating the nuisance.
Id. at 366, 522 S.E.2d at 17. A dissenting opinion for three judges maintained that
defendant had not created a nuisance. Id. at 369-70, 522 S.E.2d at 19 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
291. 241 Ga. App. 499, 526 S.E.2d 922 (1999).
292. Id. at 499, 526 S.E.2d at 923. In return, defendant school authorities had agreed
to, and did, employ plaintiff for the first three years. Id. The court noted that "[u]nder
OCGA § 20-2-942, a teacher obtains tenured status when he or she accepts a school year
contract for the fourth consecutive year from the same local board of education." Id. at 500,
526 S.E.2d at 924. The effect of plaintiff's nonrenewal, therefore, would result in her failing
to obtain tenured status.
293. Id. Plaintiff argued that "she was fraudulently induced to enter into. the
settlement agreement by false representations that she would be treated fairly and would
not be prejudiced by the fact that she had threatened a lawsuit." Id.
294. Id. at 500-01, 526 S.E.2d at 924. "[Plaintiff] has no claim against the defendants
for fraud. Making and violating a contemporaneous parol agreement inconsistent with a
written agreement is not such fraud as would permit a varying of the written instrument,
where no sufficient reason appears why the agreement was not incorporated in the
writing." Id.
295. On the issue of liability of local government officers and employees, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV.
747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local Government Law:
The HauntingHiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); The Summer of'92, supra
note 70.
296. 271 Ga. 414, 520 S.E.2d 896 (1999).
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school property.29 7
On grounds that defendant enjoyed "official
immunity" unless he acted with "actual malice,"298 the supreme court
rejected the court of appeals' decision that a showing of "ill will" was
sufficient.299 "[Iun the context of official immunity," the court declared,
"actual malice means a deliberate intention to do a wrongful act ....
Such act may be accomplished with or without ill will and whether or
not injury was intended.""' Here, the court found no evidence of the
coach's deliberate intent to act wrongfully or to harm and, thus,
sustained summary judgment in his favor.30'
J.

Authorities

Litigation involving county authorities increased its tempo a bit during
the period under scrutiny. The supreme court focused on the pivotal
importance of the authority's creating legislation in Henderman v.
Walton County Water & Sewerage Authority. °2 There, on grounds of
sovereign immunity, the court upheld summary judgment for the
authority against charges of negligence in designing, inspecting, and
maintaining plaintiffs' water lines.30 3 "The creation of a political

297. Id. at 414,520 S.E.2d at 897. Plaintiff complained of a wrist injury resulting from
use of the scissors. Id.
298. Under the 1991 amendment to the Georgia Constitution, the court said that
officers and employees "'may be liable for injuries and damages if they act with actual
malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their official functions.
Id., 520 S.E.2d at 898 (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d)).

299. Id., 520 S.E.2d at 897 (citing Hazelwood v. Adams, 235 Ga. App. 607, 510 S.E.2d
147 (1998)). The court of appeals found that there was some evidence "from which a jury
could find that [the coach] acted with ill will." Id. The supreme court reasoned that
equating ill will and actual malice in this fashion would lead to the "absurd result" of
piercing official immunity "solely on the basis of the defendant's rancorous personal
feelings towards the plaintiff, even though the defendant's actions in regard to the disliked
plaintiff may have been completely lawful and legally justified." Id. at 415, 520 S.E.2d at
898.
300. Id. (citations omitted).
301. Id. at 416, 520 S.E.2d at 899. The previously noted case of Chamlee also included
a charge of individual liability on the part of the automotive shop instructor teaching the
class in which the student was injured while riding in a faculty member's car that was
being test driven as a part of the course. 239 Ga. App. at 183, 521 S.E.2d at 79. There,
the court of appeals said that official immunity protected defendant for discretionary
actions done without willfulness, malice, or corruption. Id. at 184, 521 S.E.2d at 79.
"[M]onitoring, supervising and otherwise controlling students are considered discretionary
acts," and the shop instructor was protected by official immunity. Id., 521 S.E.2d at 80.
302. 271 Ga. 192, 515 S.E.2d 617 (1999).
303. Id. at 193, 515 S.E.2d at 618. Plaintiffs complained of "personal and property
damage from bacteria-laden water." Id.
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subdivision of the state and the extension of immunity to that subdivision is within the authority of the legislature." °4
Hay v. Development Authority. 5 featured a bond validation proceeding in which plaintiffs were denied the right to participate as objectors
because they had not served a motion to intervene as prescribed by
statute.3 6 Reversing that denial, the court of appeals turned its
decision on the language of yet another statute:3 ' "Any citizen of this
state who is a resident of the county, municipality, or political subdivision desiring to issue the bonds may become a party to the proceedings
at or before the time set for the hearing." 3 1 Under that language, the
court held that citizens need not follow procedures of the intervention
statute to become proper parties to the validation proceeding.3 9
In Carroll County Water Authority v. Bunch,3 1 the authority complained of abusive litigation on the part of a consumer, the consumer's
attorney, and the attorney's professional corporation.3 n On grounds
that plaintiff's ante litem notice was addressed only to the consumer and
through his attorney,312 the court of appeals upheld a summary
judgment for the attorney and his corporation.313 Expressly affording
the abusive litigation statute a "strict judicial construction,"3 4 the
court emphasized that "[tihe Water Authority's letter fails to specify [the

304. Id. 1972 Ga. Laws 3623 provided that the authority was "deemed to be a political
subdivision of the State of Georgia" with "the same immunity and exemption from liability
for torts and negligence as (the] County." 1972 Ga. Laws 3623, 3636.
305. 239 Ga. App. 803, 521 S.E.2d 912 (1999).
306. Id. at 803, 521 S.E.2d at 913. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(c) requires the motion to
intervene and an accompanying pleading. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(c) (1993).
307. 239 Ga. App. at 804, 521 S.E.2d at 913.
308. O.C.G.A. § 36-82-23 (2000).
309. 239 Ga. App. at 804-05, 521 S.E.2d at 914. "The words 'may become a party' have
a somewhat different meaning from 'may intervene,' and on the face of OCGA § 36-82-23,
there is no mandatory requirement of following the intervention procedure of OCGA § 9-1124." Id. The court ordered another validation hearing in which plaintiffs would be allowed
to participate as parties to the proceeding. Id. at 805, 521 S.E.2d at 914.
310. 240 Ga. App. 533, 523 S.E.2d 412 (1999).
311. Id. at 533, 523 S.E.2d at 413. The authority had successfully defended itself
against the consumer's claims of fraud and racketeering. Id.
312. The letter was addressed to the consumer "by and through [your] attorney of
record." Id. at 534, 523 S.E.2d at 413.
313. Id. at 535, 523 S.E.2d at 414.
314. This was because the tort of abusive litigation is in derogation of the common law.
Id. at 534, 523 S.E.2d at 413. "The result of strict judicial construction is that every person
against whom an injured litigant would seek damages for abusive litigation must be given
specific notice of that intent." Id. (emphasis added).
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attorney or his corporation] as a party against whom damages for

abusive litigation would be sought."315
Finally, the court of appeals rendered its first impression construction
of Georgia's Hospital Acquisition Act,316 a statute prohibiting the
purchase of a nonprofit hospital without notifying the attorney general
before consummation of the transaction.1 7 Sparks v. Hospital Authority3"' involved an agreement under which the authority transferred
control and operation of its hospital to a private medical center. The
agreement provided that it was binding on the parties but that the
agreement would not be consummated until after the attorney general's
approval.31 9 The court held that arrangement to fail the acquisition
statute's requirement that "before any transaction is consummated[,] the
Attorney General will hold a public hearing to provide a forum for
meaningful public input about the transaction." 320 Rather, the parties
had "effectively consummated the transaction between themselves before
any public hearing was held." 32' Their agreement "contravened the
Act's purpose-to provide community involvement in the transaction"-and
the trial judge had erred in approving the transaction.32 2
K

Zoning

In Gwinnett County v. Davis,323 the supreme court reversed for the
second time a trial judge's decision that plaintiff landowners had shown
324
a significant detriment from the current zoning of their property.

315. Id.
316. O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-400 to -412 (Supp. 2000).
317. Id. § 31-7-401. The statute requires that the parties to the agreement notify the
Attorney General, specifies the information that they must provide, requires the Attorney
General to hold a public hearing on the transaction, and requires that the Attorney
General receive written comments from any interested person. Id. §§ 31-7-401, -402, -405.
The Attorney General is to determine whether the transaction is in the public interest. Id.
§ 31-7-406.
318. 241 Ga. App. 485, 526 S.E.2d 593 (1999).
319. Id. at 486, 526 S.E.2d at 594-95.
320. Id. at 487, 526 S.E.2d at 595.
321. Id.
322. Id.
The problem with the superior court's interpretation of the Act is that it allows
the parties to a transaction to circumvent any meaningful public input about the
transaction. And the Act clearly contemplates that before any transaction is
consummated the Attorney General will hold a public hearing to provide a forum
for meaningful public input about the transaction.
Id.
323. 271 Ga. 158, 517 S.E.2d 324 (1999).
324. Id. at 159, 517 S.E.2d at 325. In that case, the court said, "the trial court
concluded that the [plaintiffs] suffered a significant loss based solely on evidence that the
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Reviewing the evidence, the court reasoned that plaintiffs had purchased
their property as a single family residence and continued to use it in
that manner. 325 "They offered no evidence that the property is worth
less than they paid for it in 1994, or that they have been unable to sell
the land for residential use as presently zoned."3 26 Rather, "[aill that
has been shown is that the [plaintiffs] will suffer an economic loss if
their rezoning request is denied," but "diminution in value alone does
not constitute a constitutional deprivation." 327 Accordingly, the court
concluded, plaintiffs had not shown a "substantial detriment"
nor
"rebutted the constitutionality of the R-100 classification."3 28
III.

LEGISLATION

The General Assembly's first session of the new decade yielded a
number of measures impacting Georgia's local governments. A few
examples will at least serve to illustrate the range of the legislative
agenda.
One important statute effected a number of changes in municipal
annexations: 29 It empowers cities in counties with a population of
more than 100,000 to utilize the "100% method" of annexation; 330 it
restricts "spoke" annexations; 331 it conditions first-time cross-county
boundary annexations upon county approval; it permits ordinance
annexation of unincorporated "islands" of more than 333
fifty acres; 332 and
territory.
it requires clearer identification of annexed
Additional local government authorizations included power to contract
with private entities for the design and construction of waste-water
treatment systems and water and sewer systems;3 34 power to dissolve

property as zoned is worth substantially less than it would be if it were rezoned and put
to another use . . . ." Id. That, the court said, was an "erroneous legal theory." Id. See
Gwinnett County v. Davis, 268 Ga. 653, 492 S.E.2d 523 (1997).
325. 271 Ga. at 159, 517 S.E.2d at 325.
326. Id., 517 S.E.2d at 326.
327. Id. at 160, 517 S.E.2d at 326.
328. Id.
329. H.B. 1439, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000).
330. Id. Previously, only municipalities in counties under such population could utilize
this annexation method.
331. Id. The only "100% method" annexations allowed are those involving land which
touches municipal boundaries with one-eighth of its boundary or with fifty feet of its
boundary. Id.
332. Id. Previously, there was a 50-acre limit on the size of unincorporated islands that
could be annexed by municipal ordinance.
333. Id. Land must be identified by reference to the State Coordinate Map. Id.
334. H.B. 1404, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). The statute provides for the acceptance of
competitive sealed proposals for such leases and contracts. Id.
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bond-free development authorities; 335 resolution of service delivery
strategies by superior court;336 extension of the special local option
sales tax statute to fund transportation facilities; 337 power of "wet"
local governments to permit alcoholic beverage sales on election day;38
power to operate speed detection devices in marked historic districts as
in school and residential zones;33 s and power to prequalify private
engineers who may be used for building code inspections if the local
government cannot provide the inspection within two days.340
Additional local government impositions included the requirement that
local governments codify their ordinances and provide a copy to the State
Law Library;34 ' the requirement there be a limitation on the use of
multiyear lease purchase contracts for real property projects (not to
exceed 7.5% of local government revenues or $25 million);34 2 the
requirement that all public works contracts with private entities be in
writing and available for public inspection; 343 the requirement that
local government vehicles (other than law enforcement) be identified by
visible decals containing the name of the governmental entity;344 and
the requirement that local governments post notice as to their building
code inspectors' qualifications, specify building code violations upon

335. H.B. 1205, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). The statute provides that upon the authority's
dissolution, its assets and debts must be assigned to the parent (dissolving) local
government. Id.
336. H.B. 1430, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). Unresolved service delivery disputes are to be
decided by a visiting or senior superior court judge, and mandatory mediation will be an
option for the judge. Id.
337. H.B. 1303, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000).
338. H.B. 1339, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). The local government may pass an ordinance
prohibiting such sales. Id.
339. H.B. 865, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). The local government may issue speeding tickets
in historic districts for infractions of less than ten miles per hour over the posted limit. Id.
340. H.B. 151, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). The local government must accept the inspection
unless it notifies the engineer of deficiencies within two days. Id.
341. S.B. 295, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). The local government must make copies of the
codification available to the public at reasonable price. Id.
342. H.B. 1450, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). Certificates of Purchase (COPs) for multiyear
lease purchase contracts may be used for obtaining equipment and other personal property
within the 7.5% revenue limitation. Id.
343. H.B. 1079, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). The statute provides the method of advertising
for bids and prequalifying bidders and holds bidders to their bids for a period of 60 days.
The statute does not apply to local government contracts under $100,000, road contracts,
or contracts necessitated by emergencies. Id.
344. H.B. 648, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). Local governments may exempt certain of their
vehicles by adopting an ordinance or resolution following a public hearing on the matter.
Id.
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denial of a permit, and notify permit holders of local amendments to the
state minimum standards code.34
Finally, a resolution established a joint legislative study committee to
study the conditions, needs, and problems of preserving and accessing
historic local records throughout Georgia. 3
IV.

CONCLUSION

Whatever their denomination, developments in local government law
this year, both by volume and by substance, reflect a congregation of
issues both baffling and divine. Truly, they testify to a higher presence
in Georgia's legal constellation.

345. H.B. 150, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000). Qualified inspectors must complete a training
course. Id.
346. H.R. 1011, 145th Leg. (Ga. 2000).
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